The Dynamic Process of Tax Reform

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This version: June 12, 2004

Abstract

The tax reform literature, pioneered by Guesnerie [1977], uses static models but views tax reform as a dynamic process, i.e., as a policy-maker implementing incremental reforms over time. This paper studies tax reform in a dynamic version of the Diamond-Mirrlees-Guesnerie model and focuses on a specific aspect of the dynamic process, namely, the implications for tax reform of agents leaving bequests. The main idea is that a tax reform in one period will affect bequests and therefore endowments, equilibrium, and welfare in subsequent periods. Thus, the process of tax reform cannot be analyzed as a sequence of static economies; instead, the economies are linked by bequests. The paper undertakes a tax reform analysis a la Guesnerie, but with an added focus on welfare improving reforms for each generation. Second-best Pareto optima are then characterized, and these conditions are compared to the static optimal tax formulae derived in the literature. In particular, the key Diamond-Mirrlees result that production efficiency is desirable at second-best optima no longer holds in the presence of (effective) restrictions on the taxation of private savings. Restrictions on government savings (including balanced budget restrictions), however, do not disturb the desirability of production efficiency. Finally, the effects of certain political constraints on the tax reform process are also considered.

JEL classification codes: D5, D6, H2.

Keywords: Dynamic tax reform, second-best Pareto optima, capital taxation.

Acknowledgements: I thank Dustin Chambers, Jang-Ting Guo, Sushama Murty, Prasanta Pattanaik, and especially Charles Blackorby and R. Robert Russell for many helpful discussions. Participants at UCR’s Economic Theory Colloquia and the 2004 Meeting of the CEA also provided valuable comments. Any remaining errors or shortcomings are my responsibility alone.

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1. Introduction

The relevance of optimal tax formulae, as developed by Diamond and Mirrlees [1971] among others, has been questioned on several grounds. In particular, the implementation of such formulae would likely require a major upheaval of the existing tax system, which policy-makers are unwilling or unable to do. In practice, actual changes are ‘slow and piecemeal’. This has shifted the emphasis from ‘tax design’ to ‘tax reform’, see especially Guesnerie [1977, 1995]. The tax reform literature takes the existing tax system as given, and examines the conditions under which there exist (differential) changes in taxes that are equilibrium preserving and Pareto improving, i.e., feasible reforms that increase the welfare of every agent in the economy.¹

Despite using a static model, it is clear that Guesnerie [1977, 1995] views tax reform as a dynamic process, i.e., as a policy-maker implementing incremental reforms over time. The dynamic aspect is analyzed explicitly in Fogelman, Quinzii, and Guesnerie [1978], who focus on the standard technical questions raised by dynamic systems: existence and stability. The present paper, however, studies a specific aspect of the dynamic process, namely, the implications for tax reform of agents leaving bequests. The main idea is fairly straightforward: a tax reform in one period will affect bequests and therefore endowments, equilibrium, and welfare in subsequent periods. Thus, the process of tax reform cannot be analyzed as a sequence of static economies; instead, the economies are dynamically linked by bequests. Accordingly, the taxation of capital plays

¹ The optimal tax literature has also been criticized for its reliance on the existence of a social welfare function. Tax reform analysis does not require a social welfare function to be specified, although it can be helpful in some aspects.
an important role, and the government can transfer resources through time itself by running (temporary) budget deficits and surpluses. These policy instruments are not available to the government in static models, in which there are no savings and the government’s budget must always be balanced.

The paper employs a simple three-period model which is sufficient to capture the phenomena we are interested in, and the finite horizon prevents the government from running a Ponzi scheme. If the government undertakes a policy reform in period 1, bequests are likely to change, and therefore endowments, equilibrium, and welfare in subsequent periods will be disturbed. Thus, the government may be obligated to undertake reforms in periods 2 and 3, at least to restore equilibrium and balance its budget. Similarly, if the government does not reform in period 1 but does so in period 2, equilibrium and welfare in period 3 will be disturbed via the bequest and/or government bond mechanism. The model is described in greater detail in Section 2.

Section 3 undertakes a tax reform analysis *a la* Guesnerie [1977, 1995]. That is, we address the central questions of tax reform analysis: (i) does there exist an equilibrium preserving reform that makes a particular generation better-off?, and the usual question addressed in the tax reform literature: (ii) does there exist an equilibrium preserving reform that makes every agent (generation) better-off? This provides the basis for a characterization of second-best Pareto optima in Section 4, i.e., conditions under which there does not exist a feasible reform that makes every generation better-off are derived.

Section 5 examines the implications of constraints on the policy reform process which have received a great deal of attention both in academic circles and in public
policy debates. The first type of constraint considered is restrictions on the taxation of capital and the government’s ability to issue debt (say because the legislature will not approve such changes). The second type of constraint considered is a political constraint — that the welfare of generation $i$ must not be reduced in the process of implementing a policy reform (say by the need of the government to get re-elected). The main finding is that the key Diamond-Mirrlees result that production efficiency is desirable at second-best optima no longer holds in the presence of (effective) restrictions on the taxation of private savings. Restrictions on government savings (including period-by-period balanced budget restrictions), however, do not disturb the desirability of production efficiency. Regarding the political constraint, it is shown to have a surprisingly straightforward effect on the conditions for second-best optimality. Section 6 contains some concluding remarks, and summarizes the main results of the paper.

2. The Model

The model has three periods, with consumers living for one period. There is a single representative consumer in each period, so the terms ‘consumer’ and ‘generation’ are used interchangeably. The dynamic structure of the model is broadly similar to the finite horizon OLG model of Blackorby and Brett [1999, 2004], but the key feature of the present model is that each generation cares about its own welfare as well as that of the following generation. This altruism materializes as a bequest. There are two types of bequest. The first is a storable capital good which forms the basis for the capital stock and can be purchased from the firm. The second is a bond which can be purchased from the government. From the point of view of each generation, the capital good and bond are
perfect substitutes, as both shift-out the budget constraint of the recipient generation. Competition between the government and firm for private savings ensures that the prices of the capital good and government bond are the same. The details of the model are now described.

2.1. Consumers

Generation 1 chooses its net (of endowment) consumption vector of non-storable goods $x^1 \in \mathbb{R}^n$, its leisure time $l^1 \in [0, 1]$, and its bequest $\kappa^1 := k^1 + b^1 \in \mathbb{R}_+$ to solve the following program:

$$V^1(\pi^1, \rho^1, \omega^1, R) = \max U^1(x^1, l^1, \kappa^1)$$

subject to: $\pi^1 x^1 + \rho^1 \kappa^1 \leq \omega^1 (1 - l^1) + R$ (2.1)

where superscripts indicate the time period and corresponding generation, $V(\cdot)$ is the indirect utility function, $\pi \in \mathbb{R}^n_+$ is the consumer price vector corresponding to the net consumption vector $x$, $\rho \in \mathbb{R}_+$ is the consumer price of the capital good $k$ and government bond $b$ (which is the mechanism for leaving bequests), $\omega \in \mathbb{R}_+$ is the wage (or consumer price of leisure), where the endowment of leisure is normalized to unity so that $(1 - l^1)$ is labor supplied, $R \in \mathbb{R}$ is a lump-sum tax, which is restricted to be the same for each generation, and $U(\cdot)$ is the direct utility function. The restriction $\kappa^1 \in \mathbb{R}_+$ ensures that generation 1 cannot die in debt. However, the purchase of government bonds

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2 $R$ is sometimes called a poll tax or demogrant. The restriction that $R$ be the same for each generation makes the model second-best, as the government does not have access to personalized lump-sum transfers.
can be positive or negative, depending upon whether the government is running a budget deficit or surplus.

The inclusion of the bequest in generation 1’s direct utility function is simpler (and arguably more realistic) than the usual assumption made regarding bequests in OLG models — that each generation knows the utility functions of the following generations and acts as if maximizing an infinite horizon utility function.³ Program (2.1) simply says that generation 1 divides its income between purchases of non-storable goods for itself and a bequest for generation 2 to maximize a utility function which represents generation 1’s preferences over its own consumption and (in some sense) that of generation 2. In this framework, bequests provide a positive externality to the recipient generation, as they boost the recipient’s income and indirect utility (see below).

Similarly, generation 2 chooses its net consumption vector $x^2 \in \mathbb{R}^n$, its leisure time $l^2 \in [0, 1]$, and its bequest $\kappa^2 \in \mathbb{R}_+$ to solve the following program:

$$V^2(\pi^2, \rho^2, \omega^2, R, \sigma^2, \kappa^1) = \max U^2(x^2, l^2, \kappa^2)$$

subject to: $\pi^2 x^2 + \rho^2 \kappa^2 \leq \omega^2 (1-l^2) + R + \sigma^2 \kappa^1$  \hspace{1cm} (2.2)

where $\sigma^2 \in \mathbb{R}_+$ is the price generation 2 receives from selling the bequest it obtains from generation 1 to the firm (see below) and government at the beginning of the second period.

³ See chapter 3 in Blanchard and Fischer [1989]. However, Hu [1979] for example also includes bequests in the direct utility function.
Generation 3 does not leave a bequest, as it is the last generation. Alternatively, generation 3 can be thought of as a purely non-altruistic generation. It chooses its net consumption vector \( x^3 \in \mathbb{R}^n \) and leisure time \( l^3 \in [0, 1] \) to solve the following program:

\[
V^3(\pi^3, \omega^3, R, \sigma^3, \kappa^2) = \max U^3(x^3, l^3)
\]

subject to: \( \pi^3 x^3 \leq \omega^3(1 - l^3) + R + \sigma^3 \kappa^2 \)

Note that generation 1 can be thought of as the ‘start-up’ generation, as it does not receive a bequest from the (non-existent) previous generation. Similarly, generation 3 is the ‘shut-down’ generation, as it does not leave a bequest. On the other hand generation 2, which both receives and leaves bequests, is of the usual type studied in infinite horizon models. Also note that it is implicit in the above formulation that the government taxes away all pure profits, as the consumers have no profit income. The assumption of a 100 percent tax on profits, or constant returns to scale in production which implies zero maximal profits, is standard in the optimal tax and tax reform literatures.

2.2. Prices and Taxes

Consumer prices are disconnected from producer prices by a complete system of specific taxes. That is:

\[
\begin{align*}
\pi^1 &= p^1 + t^1_x \\
\pi^2 &= p^2 + t^2_x \\
\pi^3 &= p^3 + t^3_x \\
\rho^1 &= r^1 + t^1_k \\
\rho^2 &= r^2 + t^2_k \\
\rho^3 &= r^3 + t^3_k \\
\omega^1 &= w^1 + t^1_t \\
\omega^2 &= w^2 + t^2_t \\
\omega^3 &= w^3 + t^3_t \\
\sigma^2 &= s^2 + \tau^2 \\
\sigma^3 &= s^3 + \tau^3
\end{align*}
\]
where $p \in \mathbb{R}_+^n$ is the producer price vector corresponding to $x$, $r \in \mathbb{R}_+$ is the price the firm receives from selling $k$, $w \in \mathbb{R}_+^n$ is the price the firm pays for hiring labor, and $s \in \mathbb{R}_+$ is the price the firm pays for purchases of $k$. Taxes (or subsidies) are simply the difference between consumer prices and producer prices.

2.3. Production

The supply side of the economy consists of a single, aggregate, profit maximizing firm whose technology changes over time, making this formulation consistent with any assumptions regarding capital depreciation or technical progress. The firm’s profit functions are given by $\psi_1(p^1, r^1, w^1)$, $\psi_2(p^2, r^2, w^2, s^2)$, and $\psi_3(p^3, w^3, s^3)$. Application of Hotelling’s Theorem to these profit functions yields the firm’s supply and demand functions:

$$
\begin{align*}
x_1 &= x_1(p^1, r^1, w^1) \\
x_2 &= x_2(p^2, r^2, w^2, s^2) \\
x_3 &= x_3(p^3, w^3, s^3) \\
k_1 &= k_1(p^1, r^1, w^1) \\
k_2 &= k_2(p^2, r^2, w^2, s^2) \\
L_1 &= L_1(p^1, r^1, w^1) \\
L_2 &= L_2(p^2, r^2, w^2, s^2) \\
L_3 &= L_3(p^3, w^3, s^3) \\
K_2 &= K_2(p^2, r^2, w^2, s^2) \\
K_3 &= K_3(p^3, w^3, s^3)
\end{align*}
$$

where the upper-case $L$ and $K$ are used to denote the firm’s demands for labor and capital, i.e., it purchases capital from the consumers at the beginning of periods 2 and 3. The firm does not purchase any capital in period 1, as there is no supply by consumers, nor does it produce any capital in period 3, as there is no demand by consumers. Note that subscript notation indicates supply or demand by the firm.

2.4. General Competitive Equilibrium

Equilibrium is obtained if and only if:
Period 1:

\[
x^1(\pi^1, \rho^1, \omega^1, R) - x_1(p^1, r^1, w^1) \leq 0^{(n)}
\]  
(2.6)

\[
k^1(\pi^1, \rho^1, \omega^1, R) - k_1(p^1, r^1, w^1) \leq 0
\]  
(2.7)

\[
b^1(\pi^1, \rho^1, \omega^1, R) - b_1 \leq 0
\]  
(2.8)

\[
L_1(p^1, r^1, w^1) + l^1(\pi^1, \rho^1, \omega^1, R) - 1 \leq 0
\]  
(2.9)

Period 2:

\[
x^2(\pi^2, \rho^2, \omega^2, R, \sigma^2, \kappa^1) - x_2(p^2, r^2, w^2, s^2) \leq 0^{(n)}
\]  
(2.10)

\[
k^2(\pi^2, \rho^2, \omega^2, R, \sigma^2, \kappa^1) - k_2(p^2, r^2, w^2, s^2) \leq 0
\]  
(2.11)

\[
b^2(\pi^2, \rho^2, \omega^2, R, \sigma^2, \kappa^1) - b_2 \leq 0
\]  
(2.12)

\[
L_2(p^2, r^2, w^2, s^2) + l^2(\pi^2, \rho^2, \omega^2, R, \sigma^2, \kappa^1) - 1 \leq 0
\]  
(2.13)

\[
K_2(p^2, r^2, w^2, s^2) - k^1(\pi^1, \rho^1, \omega^1, R) \leq 0
\]  
(2.14)

\[
B_2 - b^1(\pi^1, \rho^1, \omega^1, R) \leq 0
\]  
(2.15)

Period 3:

\[
x^3(\pi^3, \omega^3, R, \sigma^3, \kappa^2) - x_3(p^3, w^3, s^3) \leq 0^{(n)}
\]  
(2.16)

\[
L_3(p^3, w^3, s^3) + l^3(\pi^3, \omega^3, R, \sigma^3, \kappa^2) - 1 \leq 0
\]  
(2.17)

\[
K_3(p^3, w^3, s^3) - k^2(\pi^2, \rho^2, \omega^2, R, \sigma^2, \kappa^1) \leq 0
\]  
(2.18)

\[
B_3 - b^2(\pi^2, \rho^2, \omega^2, R, \sigma^2, \kappa^1) \leq 0
\]  
(2.19)

where \(b_1\) and \(b_2\) denote the supply of bonds by the government in periods 1 and 2, and \(B_2\) and \(B_3\) denote the government’s demand (repurchases) of bonds in periods 2 and 3. The model’s finite horizon prevents the government from engaging in some sort of Ponzi
game, with Walras’ Law ensuring that the government’s budget is balanced over the three periods. Note that the periods are linked by the demand for and supply of capital and government bonds. Thus, reforms in periods 1 and 2 will disturb equilibrium in periods 2 and 3, i.e., we do not have just a sequence of static economies. For analytical purposes, it is assumed that the status quo is a ‘tight’ equilibrium, i.e., equations (2.6) – (2.19) all hold with equality.

3. Characterizing Reform Possibilities

Apart from the fixed 100 percent tax on pure profits, the government’s policy instruments are the taxes on commodities, bequests, and labor, as well as the bonds and demogrant. As the government does not supply nor demand commodities, it uses its instruments only to redistribute income (or to pick equilibria in the sense of the Second Theorem of Welfare Economics), not to finance public goods and services.

A policy reform process can be defined as a vector $dP := \langle dP^1, dP^2, dP^3, dR \rangle$ where:

$$dP^1 := \langle dp^1, dr^1, dw^1, dt^1, db^1 \rangle$$

corresponds to changes in the government’s first-period instruments, and similarly:

$$dP^2 := \langle dp^2, dr^2, dw^2, dt^2, ds^2, d\tau^2, db_2, dB_2 \rangle$$

$$dP^3 := \langle dp^3, dr^3, dw^3, dt^3, ds^3, d\tau^3, dB_3 \rangle$$

correspond to changes in the government’s second- and third-period instruments.

A reform $dP$ satisfies the equilibrium conditions (2.6) – (2.19) if and only if $\nabla Z dP \leq 0^{(3n+11)}$, where $\nabla Z$ is a Jacobian matrix of excess-demand derivatives and is
defined explicitly in the Appendix. The welfare of generation 1 increases if and only if
\[ dV^1(\cdot) = \nabla V^1 dP > 0, \]
where \( \nabla V^1 \) is the gradient of generation 1’s indirect utility function
(see the Appendix for details). Analogously, the welfare of generation 2 and 3 increase
if and only if \( dV^2(\cdot) = \nabla V^2 dP > 0 \) and \( dV^3(\cdot) = \nabla V^3 dP > 0. \)

The above formulation gives the government \( 6n + 19 \) instruments, but it must
satisfy the \( 3n + 11 \) equilibrium conditions in (2.6) – (2.19) which, by the Implicit
Function Theorem, suggests \( 3n + 8 \) degrees of freedom in picking equilibria. However,
six of these degrees of freedom are only apparent since a consumer price and a producer
price can be normalized to one in each period.\(^4\) This still leaves the government with \( 3n + 2 \)
degrees of freedom in picking equilibria. We are interested in how these equilibria
compare to the status quo on the basis of certain normative criteria, which is the issue
now addressed.

3.1. Equilibrium Preserving and Welfare Improving Reforms

In this subsection, equilibrium preserving and welfare improving reforms are
characterized \( a la \) Guesnerie [1977: Proposition 4], Guesnerie [1995: Theorem 1, p.145],
Brett [1998: Proposition 2], and more recently Murty and Russell [2003: Theorem 1].
Specifically, we want to know if there exists a feasible reform that makes a particular
generation better-off, and if there exists a feasible reform that makes every generation
(agent) better-off (which is the usual question addressed in the tax reform literature). The
answer is given by Proposition 1 and its corollaries.

\(^4\) This follows from the consumers’ demand functions being homogenous of degree zero in consumer prices
and the demogrant, and the producer's output-supply and input-demand functions being homogenous of
degree zero in producer prices.
Proposition 1:

Let \( \Gamma \subseteq \mathbb{R}^{6n+19} \) be the cone generated by taking non-negative linear combinations of the rows of \( \nabla Z \). If \( \nabla V^i \in \Gamma \), then there does not exist an equilibrium preserving policy reform process that makes generation \( i \) better-off. If \( \nabla V^i \notin \Gamma \), then there exists an equilibrium preserving policy reform process that makes generation \( i \) better-off.

Proof:

By Farkas’ Theorem (see Appendix), there exists a \( \mu \in \mathbb{R}^{3n+11} \) such that \( \mu \nabla Z = \nabla V^i \), or there exists a \( dP \) such that \( \nabla ZdP \leq 0^{(3n+11)} \) and \( \nabla V^idP > 0 \). Next, note that \( \nabla V^i \in \Gamma \) implies that there must exist a \( \mu \in \mathbb{R}^{3n+11} \) such that \( \mu \nabla Z = \nabla V^i \), which by Farkas’ Theorem implies no solution \( dP \) to \( \nabla ZdP \leq 0^{(3n+11)} \) and \( \nabla V^idP > 0 \). That is, there does not exist an equilibrium preserving policy reform process that makes generation \( i \) better-off. Conversely, \( \nabla V^i \notin \Gamma \) implies that there cannot exist a \( \mu \in \mathbb{R}^{3n+11} \) such that \( \mu \nabla Z = \nabla V^i \), which means there exists a reform \( dP \) such that \( \nabla ZdP \leq 0^{(3n+11)} \) and \( \nabla V^idP > 0 \).

Following the existing tax reform literature, we are particularly interested in the possibility of equilibrium preserving and Pareto improving reforms. In the present context, these are those (ideal) reforms which are feasible and improve the welfare of every generation.

Corollary 1.1:

If \( \nabla V^1 \in \Gamma \) or \( \nabla V^2 \in \Gamma \) or \( \nabla V^3 \in \Gamma \), then there does not exist an equilibrium preserving and Pareto improving policy reform process. That is, the economy is at a local second-best optimum.
Corollary 1.2: Suppose $\Gamma \cap -\Gamma = \{0^{(6n+19)}\}$, i.e., $\Gamma$ is a pointed cone. Let $-P(\Gamma)$ be the negative polar cone of $\Gamma$. If $-P(\Gamma) \subseteq -\Gamma$ and $\nabla V^1 \in -\Gamma$ and $\nabla V^2 \in -\Gamma$ and $\nabla V^3 \in -\Gamma$, then there exists an equilibrium preserving and Pareto improving policy reform process. That is, the economy is not at a local second-best optimum.

Corollary 1.3: Suppose $\Gamma \cap -\Gamma = \{0^{(6n+19)}\}$, i.e., $\Gamma$ is a pointed cone. Let $-P(\Gamma)$ be the negative polar cone of $\Gamma$. If $-\Gamma \subseteq -P(\Gamma)$ and $\nabla V^1 \in -P(\Gamma)$ and $\nabla V^2 \in -P(\Gamma)$ and $\nabla V^3 \in -P(\Gamma)$, then there exists an equilibrium preserving and Pareto improving policy reform process. That is, the economy is not at a local second-best optimum.

Corollary 1.4: If $\nabla V^1 \not\in \Gamma$ and $\nabla V^2 \not\in \Gamma$ and $\nabla V^3 \not\in \Gamma$, and at least one of these vectors is an element of the complement of $\Gamma \cup -P(\Gamma) \cup -\Gamma$ (relative to $\mathbb{R}^{6n+19}$), then there may or may not exist an equilibrium preserving and Pareto improving policy reform process.

Some intuition for Proposition 1 and its corollaries can be obtained by reference to Figure 1. The top panel of Figure 1 illustrates an example (in a stylized two-dimensional manner) in which there exists an equilibrium preserving reform that makes generation 1 better-off, but generations 2 and 3 are made worse-off. A reform $dP$ is equilibrium preserving if it forms an obtuse angle with all the rows of $\nabla Z$. Letting $\Gamma$ denote the cone generated by taking non-negative linear combinations of the rows of $\nabla Z$, the set of equilibrium preserving reforms is therefore $-P(\Gamma)$, i.e., the negative polar cone of $\Gamma$. A reform $dP$ makes generation $i$ better-off if $dP$ forms a strictly acute angle with the
gradient of generation $i$’s indirect utility function $\nabla V^i$. In the top panel of Figure 1, the shaded area is the set of equilibrium preserving reforms which make generation 1 better-off. However, all equilibrium preserving reforms make generations 2 and 3 worse-off, as they all form obtuse angles with $\nabla V^2$ and $\nabla V^3$.

Further insight into Proposition 1 can be obtained by considering the hypothetical problem of choosing the policy instruments $P$ to maximize the welfare of some generation $i$ subject to the equilibrium preserving constraints (2.6) – (2.19). Suppose $\tilde{P}$ solves this problem, then by the Kuhn-Tucker Theorem there exists a $\tilde{\mu} \in \mathbb{R}^{3n+11}$ such that:

$$\tilde{\mu}\nabla Z = \nabla V^d$$  \hspace{1cm} (KT)

where $\tilde{\mu}$ is a vector of Kuhn-Tucker multipliers. If $\nabla V^d \notin \Gamma$, then there cannot exist a vector $\tilde{\mu} \in \mathbb{R}^{3n+11}$ such that (KT) is satisfied. That is, the status quo equilibrium does not ‘look like’ the policy instruments have already been chosen to maximize the welfare of generation $i$. In this case, there must exist a feasible reform which makes generation $i$ better-off. On the other hand, if there does not exist a feasible reform which makes generation $i$ better-off, then (KT) is satisfied and the status quo equilibrium ‘looks like’ the policy instruments have already been chosen to maximize the welfare of generation $i$.

In order for there to exist an equilibrium preserving and Pareto improving reform, the vectors $\nabla V^1$, $\nabla V^2$, and $\nabla V^3$ must be ‘close enough’ in the sense made precise by Corollaries 1.1 – 1.4. The bottom panel of Figure 1 illustrates an example (again in a stylized two-dimensional manner) in which there exists an equilibrium preserving and
Pareto improving reform. In this example $\nabla V^1$, $\nabla V^2$, and $\nabla V^3$ are all elements of $-\Gamma$, which is a sufficient condition for there to exist an equilibrium preserving and Pareto improving reform (refer Corollary 1.2).

While Proposition 1 might be criticized for being too abstract, this is unavoidable. The question of tax reform is a difficult one, and it does not lend itself to a simple answer with a straightforward economic interpretation. However, the usefulness of Proposition 1 is that it forms the basis for the characterization of second-best Pareto optima (see below), and it provides an empirically implementable methodology for identifying the possibility of welfare improving reforms. That is, the criteria of Proposition 1 can be checked empirically by constructing the cone $\Gamma$ and with knowledge of the gradients of the consumers’ indirect utility functions. The construction of $\Gamma$ requires estimates of various aggregate demand and supply derivatives. The gradients of the consumers’ indirect utility functions are not directly observable. However, by Roy’s Theorem, $\nabla V^i$ is proportional to consumer $i$’s consumption vector, and survey data are available which provide details on household consumption (e.g., the household survey used to construct the CPI). In sum, the information requirements of Proposition 1 (and its corollaries) can be met. Examples of empirical applications of tax reform theory, following the work of Guesnerie [1977], are King [1983] and Ahmad and Stern [1984].

4. Second-Best Pareto Optima

As noted by Guesnerie [1977] and Weymark [1979], necessary conditions for the non-existence of an equilibrium preserving and Pareto improving reform are, in fact, necessary conditions for the initial position to be Pareto optimal. In other words, these
conditions characterize second-best optima as in the optimal tax literature, and are derived in the following proposition.

**Proposition 2:**

Let \( \nabla V \) be the \( 3 \times (6n + 19) \) matrix formed by the vectors \( \nabla V^1, \nabla V^2, \) and \( \nabla V^3 \). If there does not exist a policy reform process \( dP \) such that:

\[
\nabla Z dP \leq 0^{(3n+11)}
\]

\[
\nabla V dP \gg 0^{(3)}
\]

That is, if there does not exist an equilibrium preserving and Pareto improving policy reform process, then the economy is at a local second-best optimum and there exist two vectors of multipliers \( \lambda > 0^{(3)} \) and \( \mu \geq 0^{(3n+11)} \) such that:

\[
\lambda \nabla V = \mu \nabla Z
\]

(4.1)

**Proof:**

Follows from Motzkin’s Theorem of the Alternative (see Appendix).

The existence of the multipliers guaranteed by Proposition 2 is not very informative in itself. However, each multiplier \( \lambda_i \) can be interpreted as the *implied welfare weight* of generation \( i \), and the multipliers \( \mu \) are the *social shadow prices* of the \( 3n + 11 \) commodities. That is, if the government could choose its policy instruments to maximize a social welfare function \( W(V^1, V^2, V^3) \) subject to (2.6) – (2.19), then 

\[
\lambda_i = \frac{\partial W(\cdot)}{\partial V^i}
\]

and \( \mu \) is the vector of multipliers attached to the \( 3n + 11 \) constraints in (2.6) – (2.19). In other words, if there does not exist an equilibrium preserving and Pareto improving policy reform process, the economy ‘looks like’ the government has already
chosen its policy instruments to maximize a social welfare function. For future reference, we define:

$$\beta_i = \frac{\partial W(\cdot)}{\partial V^i(\cdot)} \frac{\partial V^i(\cdot)}{\partial I^i}$$

which is known in the optimal tax literature as the *social marginal utility of income* of generation $i$ ($\partial V^i(\cdot)/\partial I^i$ is generation $i$’s private marginal utility of income).

Expanding (4.1) yields the first-order (necessary) conditions for second-best optimality. The system (4.1) contains 25 equations which correspond to the government’s $6n + 19$ policy instruments. Each equation in (4.1) has a standard interpretation in the optimal tax literature: at an optimum, the *marginal social benefit* of a change in any instrument is equal to the *marginal social cost* of that change. For example, a tax decrease which reduces the consumer price of some good will boost consumption of that good and welfare. This is the benefit. The cost is that the increase in demand must be met by an increase in supply by transferring resources from other sectors of the economy.

Some characteristics of the second-best Pareto optima — in particular, how they compare to the optima of the static Diamond-Mirrlees-Guesnerie model — are discussed in the following corollaries. Proofs, where necessary, are relegated to the Appendix.

**Corollary 2.1:**

*At all second-best Pareto optima production efficiency holds. That is, social shadow prices are proportional to producer prices in each period.*

---

The term ‘production efficiency’ has been used in various guises in the optimal tax and tax reform literatures. Diamond and Mirrlees [1971] say production is efficient if technical rates of substitution in private and public sector production are equal. This is the usual definition of production efficiency. In Guesnerie [1977, 1995: Chapter 3] an equilibrium is temporarily (production) inefficient if it involves excess supply of some goods, i.e., ‘non-tight’ equilibria. Blackorby and Brett [2000], see also Guesnerie [1995: Chapter 4], define an equilibrium to be production efficient if producer prices are proportional to social shadow prices. This is equivalent to the Diamond-Mirrlees definition if there is a public producer, because social shadow prices are the relevant prices for public production decisions. It is in this latter sense that this paper refers to production efficiency.6

As noted by Guesnerie [1995: p.192], it is generally difficult to assess the relationship between social values and market prices (or more generally with technological conditions prevailing in the economy) in a second-best model with consumer prices disconnected from producer prices. However, Corollary 2.1 shows that social shadow prices are proportional to producer prices at all second-best optima. This reinforces the key Diamond-Mirrlees result (but in a dynamic model with bequests which generate a positive externality) that production efficiency is desirable at second-best Pareto optima, despite the second-best nature of the model.7

---

6 In order to minimize notation, the government’s provision of public goods is not explicitly modeled.

7 Recall the Lipsey and Lancaster [1956] general theorem of the second best, which asserts that if a distortion prevents the attainment of one of the conditions for first-best Pareto optimality, then the other conditions, although attainable, are generally no longer desirable. The distortion in the present context is
Corollary 2.2:

At all second-best Pareto optima, the multipliers attached to the bond market equations (2.8), (2.12), (2.15), and (2.19) are all equal to zero. That is, differential changes in the government’s debt instruments $b_1, b_2, B_2,$ and $B_3$ have no social value.

Corollary 2.2 states that, at all second-best Pareto optima, differential changes in the government’s debt instruments have no social value. This follows from the fact that the government has direct control over its bond issues. If changes in its debt instruments can increase social welfare, then the economy cannot be at an optimum.

Corollary 2.3:

At all second-best Pareto optima, the marginal social benefits of increasing the taxes $t^1_x$, $t^2_x$, and $t^3_x$ on the first-, second-, and third-period consumption goods are given by, respectively:

$$-\beta_1 x^1 + \beta_2 \sigma^2 \nu_1 \kappa^1 + \beta_3 \sigma^3 \nu_1 \kappa^2$$

$$-\beta_2 x^2 + \beta_3 \sigma^3 \nu_2 \kappa^2$$

$$-\beta_3 x^3$$

Therefore, given sufficient substitutability between bequests and the consumption goods, the marginal social benefits of increasing $t^1_x$ and $t^2_x$ may be positive.

In static models, the marginal social benefit of increasing consumption taxes is necessarily negative. In the present dynamic model, however, generations 1 and 2 may
substitute bequests for their own consumption, boosting the incomes and welfare of the recipient generations. For example, consider the first equation in Corollary 2.3. The first term shows the negative welfare effect of increasing $t^1_1$ on generation 1, which operates through higher first-period consumer prices. The second and third terms show the welfare effects on generations 2 and 3, which are positive if $\nabla_{\kappa^1_1}^{\pi_1} \kappa^1$ and $\nabla_{\kappa^2_2}^{\pi_2} \kappa^2$ are positive. Thus, it is possible that the marginal social benefit of increasing consumption taxes is positive, especially in regions of the Pareto frontier in which the implied welfare weight of the saving (i.e., bequesting) generation is low relative to the recipient’s implied welfare weight (as governed by the magnitude of $\beta_i$).

The marginal social benefits of decreasing the taxes on labor income, however, are always positive as in static models, provided the bequests are normal goods (which is probably a safe assumption). That is:

**Corollary 2.4:**

At all second-best Pareto optima, the marginal social benefits of decreasing the taxes $t^1_1$, $t^2_2$, and $t^3_3$ on first-, second-, and third-period labor income are given by, respectively:

$$
\beta_1 (1 - l^1) + \beta_2 \sigma^3 \nabla_{\omega_1}^{\pi_1} \kappa^1
+ \beta_3 \sigma^3 \nabla_{\omega_2}^{\pi_2} \kappa^2
$$

$$
\beta_2 (1 - l^2) + \beta_3 \sigma^3 \nabla_{\omega_2}^{\pi_2} \kappa^2
$$

$$
\beta_3 (1 - l^3)
$$

Therefore, if the bequests $\kappa^1$ and $\kappa^2$ are both normal goods, then the marginal social benefits of decreasing the taxes on labor income are always positive.
Consider the first equation in Corollary 2.4. The first term shows the direct benefit to generation 1 of a decrease in its labor income tax \( t_1 \). The second term shows the benefit to generation 2 if generation 1 spends part of its increase in post-tax labor income on the bequest \( \kappa^1 \). This increases generation 2’s income, so the third term shows the benefit to generation 3 if part of the increase in generation 2’s income is spent on the bequest \( \kappa^2 \).

Together, Corollaries 2.3 and 2.4 provide some comfort to economists who favor substituting consumption taxes for income taxes. It should be noted, however, that the marginal social benefit of increasing consumption taxes is positive only if bequests and consumption goods are, in fact, substitutes. It is equally likely that, if faced with an increase in consumer prices, consumers will reduce their bequests in order to maintain their own levels of consumption.

5. Constraints on the Policy Reform Process

It has thus far been assumed that the government can change all taxes and issue bonds at will. In reality, however, it is well known that no central authority controls all taxes, and typically the government must seek legislative approval for changes. This can potentially hinder the government’s ability to implement reforms. It is also the case that the government may be unable to implement reforms which reduce the welfare of the current generation (say by the need to get re-elected), even if such reforms increase the welfare of future generations, i.e., even if the short-run costs are outweighed by the long-run benefits. This places a political constraint on the set of reforms. These issues are addressed in this section.
5.1. Restrictions on the Government’s Intertemporal Policy Instruments

The taxation of capital has long been a controversial issue, and proposed increases in capital taxation may be blocked by the legislature for political reasons. Restrictions on the government’s ability to issue debt, such as period-by-period balanced budget restrictions, have also been proposed. We explore the consequences of such restrictions on the policy reform process.

First, suppose the government is not permitted to increase the taxes on savings (i.e., purchases of the capital good) by generations 1 and 2. That is, we impose the restrictions\(d_{t_1}^1 \leq 0\) and \(d_{t_2}^2 \leq 0\). By Motzkin’s Theorem, if there is no solution \(dP\) to:

\[
\nabla Z dP \leq 0^{(3n+11)} \quad \nabla V dP \gg 0^{(3)} \quad \begin{pmatrix} 0^{(2n+1)} & -1 & 0^{(4n+17)} \\ 0^{(4n+6)} & -1 & 0^{(2n+12)} \end{pmatrix} dP \geq 0^{(2)}
\]

That is, if there does not exist an equilibrium preserving and Pareto improving policy reform process (with the restrictions on savings taxation), then there exist vectors \(\lambda > 0^{(3)}\), \(\mu \geq 0^{(3n+11)}\), and \(\theta \geq 0^{(2)}\) such that:

\[
\lambda \nabla V + \theta \begin{pmatrix} 0^{(2n+1)} & -1 & 0^{(4n+17)} \\ 0^{(4n+6)} & -1 & 0^{(2n+12)} \end{pmatrix} = \mu \nabla Z
\]

The system (5.1) is the same as the system (4.1) which characterizes unrestricted second-best optima, except the 4th and 11th equations in (5.1) include the multipliers \((\theta_1, \theta_2)\) which correspond to the restrictions on capital taxation. Note that if either of the restrictions are binding, i.e., if there exists an equilibrium preserving and Pareto improvement, then the system above implies that either \(\lambda = 0^{(3)}\) or \(\mu > 0^{(3n+11)}\) or \(\theta > 0^{(2)}\).

---

\(^8\) Blackorby and Brett [2004] address the question as to whether it is optimal to tax capital.
improving reform in the absence of the restrictions, then $\theta \neq 0^{(2)}$. This leads to the following proposition, which is proved in the Appendix.

**Proposition 3:**

*Suppose the government is not permitted to increase the taxes on savings by generations 1 and 2. Then production efficiency holds in period 1 (period 2) at all second-best Pareto optima if and only if the constraint on the taxation of savings in period 1 (period 2) is not binding. (Note: production efficiency always remains desirable in period 3.)*

In other words, production efficiency is no longer a necessary condition for second-best optimality if the government cannot increase the taxes on capital. In regions of the Pareto frontier in which the constraints are not binding, production efficiency remains desirable. However, when one of the constraints is binding, the marginal social benefit of increasing the corresponding tax is greater than the marginal social cost. In this case, the government would like to increase the tax to directly determine bequests and the supply of capital available to the firm. Instead, it must distort producer prices relative to social shadow prices as an indirect (and imperfect) means of control. For example, the government might instruct a public producer to use more than the efficient quantity of capital in order to (indirectly) increase the price of capital. Roughly speaking, this is the classic ‘two wrongs make a right’ result of second-best theory.

The second way that the government can influence intertemporal income transfers is by issuing bonds itself. However, history suggests that government deficits and debt levels can become excessive, imposing a burden on future generations. In response, some
economists have argued in favor of various forms of fiscal constraint, the most extreme of which are balanced budget restrictions. The following result, which is proved in the Appendix, shows that such restrictions do not disturb production efficiency.

**Proposition 4:**

*Production efficiency remains desirable at all second-best Pareto optima in the presence of constraints on the government’s debt instruments, including period-by-period balanced budget restrictions, whether or not the constraints are binding.*

From the point of view of production efficiency, then, restrictions on the government’s ability to issue debt are preferable to restrictions on the government’s ability to tax private capital. Even though the capital good and government bonds are perfect substitutes (from the perspective of each generation), purchases and sales of bonds are transactions between consumers and the government only; they do not involve the production sector. The producer is affected only indirectly by the prices it receives and pays for capital.

5.2. **Social Welfare and Political Constraints**

Until now attention has focused on the possibility of Pareto improving reforms, i.e., reforms which increase the welfare of every generation. However, the Pareto criterion can be criticized as being much too demanding, especially if the status quo equilibrium involves a highly unequal distribution of income. Moreover, in general, the set of feasible reforms which increase the welfare of every agent in the economy is likely to be small, if not empty. For these reasons, the government may instead refer to a social welfare function \( W(V^1, V^2, V^3) \). However, the government may have to ensure that
reform does not reduce the welfare of some generation, say by the need to get re-elected. This places a political constraint on the set of social-welfare improving reforms.

First, we show in Proposition 5 that a characterization analogous to that in Proposition 1 goes through using the social-welfare criterion (excluding for the moment political constraints). Note that a reform \( dP \) increases social welfare if and only if \( dW = \nabla W dP > 0 \), where \( \nabla W \) is the gradient of the social welfare function and is defined explicitly in the Appendix.

**Proposition 5:**

If \( \nabla W \in \Gamma \), then there does not exist an equilibrium preserving policy reform process that increases social welfare. If \( \nabla W \notin \Gamma \), then there exists an equilibrium preserving policy reform process that increases social welfare.

**Proof:**

By Farkas' Theorem, there exists a \( \mu \in \mathbb{R}^{3n+11}_+ \) such that \( \mu \nabla Z = \nabla W \), or there exists a \( dP \) such that \( \nabla Z dP \leq 0^{(3n+11)} \) and \( \nabla W dP > 0 \). Next, note that \( \nabla W \in \Gamma \) implies that there must exist a \( \mu \in \mathbb{R}^{3n+11}_+ \) such that \( \mu \nabla Z = \nabla W \). Conversely, \( \nabla W \notin \Gamma \) implies that there cannot exist a \( \mu \in \mathbb{R}^{3n+11}_+ \) such that \( \mu \nabla Z = \nabla W \). 

**Corollary 5.1:**

If \( \nabla W \in \Gamma \) the economy is at a local second-best optimum and there exists a vector of multipliers \( \mu \in \mathbb{R}^{3n+11}_+ \) such that:

\[
\nabla W = \mu \nabla Z
\]  

(5.2)
The system of equations (5.2) is identical to the system (4.1). Thus, it makes no difference whether second-best optima are characterized using the Pareto criterion or the social-welfare criterion. Intuition for this result is provided in the discussion of Proposition 6 below.

We can now examine the implications of political constraints on the policy reform process. Specifically, suppose the welfare of generation $i$ cannot be reduced in the process of implementing a social-welfare improving reform. By Motzkin’s Theorem, if there does not exist a policy reform process $dP$ such that:

$$\nabla Z dP \leq 0^{(3n+11)} \quad \nabla W dP > 0 \quad \nabla V_i dP \geq 0$$

then there exists $\gamma > 0$, $\bar{\mu} \geq 0^{(3n+11)}$, and $\bar{\theta} \geq 0$ such that:

$$\nabla W + \theta \nabla V_i = \mu \nabla Z$$

where $\theta = \bar{\theta} / \gamma$ and $\mu = \bar{\mu} / \gamma$. If the political constraint is binding ($\theta \neq 0$) there exists a social-welfare improving reform, but all such reforms make generation $i$ worse-off. The following result can now be stated.

**Proposition 6:**

Suppose the government is prevented from implementing social-welfare improving reforms which make generation $i$ worse-off. Then second-best Pareto optima are still characterized by (4.1), except $\lambda_i$ is replaced by $\lambda_i + \theta$.

That is, the political constraint simply acts to increase the implied welfare weight of generation $i$ from $\lambda_i$ to $\lambda_i + \theta$. The intuition can be explained by reference to Figure 2. Conditions for second-best optimality hold at all points on the Pareto frontier. The
political constraint, requiring that the welfare of generation 1 (for example) not be reduced below its initial level (say $\bar{U}^1$), means that the economy is initially at a point on the Pareto frontier (say $\bar{E}$) which is relatively favorable to generation 1. In the absence of the political constraint, the government could implement a social-welfare improving reform and move the economy towards $E^*$. 

Thus, the social-welfare approach and political constraints do not fundamentally alter the necessary conditions for second-best Pareto optimality obtained in Section 4. This implies that the results obtained earlier in the paper are robust to this alternative approach (except that the implied welfare weight of generation $i$ is increased if the political constraint favoring generation $i$ is binding).

6. Concluding Comments

The existing tax reform literature views tax reform as a dynamic process, but it uses static models. Examples of this literature include: Guesnerie [1977, 1995], Diewert [1978], Dixit [1979], Weymark [1979], Brett [1998], and Murty and Russell [2003]. This paper has examined tax reform in a dynamic version of the Diamond-Mirrlees-Guesnerie model (which is the classic model used in optimal tax and tax reform) whereby the periods (or economies) are dynamically linked by bequests, and the government can run (temporary) budget deficits and surpluses. In this framework, the process of tax reform cannot be analyzed as a sequence of static economies. The main contributions of the paper are:

1. the development of a simple dynamic model which makes it possible to analyze tax reform as a dynamic process;
2. the development of a tax reform methodology which makes it possible to derive the conditions under which each generation/agent can and cannot be made better-off (in addition to the usual Pareto improving conditions);

3. second-best Pareto optima have been characterized as in the optimal tax literature, with special attention paid to intertemporal conditions and how these compare to static optimal tax formulae;

4. production efficiency is shown to be desirable at all second-best Pareto optima, reinforcing the key Diamond-Mirrlees result (but in a dynamic model), but not if there are restrictions on the taxation of private savings. Restrictions on government savings, however, do not disturb the desirability of production efficiency; and

5. it makes no difference whether second-best optima are characterized using the Pareto criterion or the social-welfare criterion, and political constraints which favor some generation simply increase the implied welfare weight of that generation (without disturbing fundamentally the conditions for second-best optimality).

Regarding the issue of production efficiency, the paper contributes to a continuing literature which concludes that the Diamond-Mirrlees result is the exception rather than the rule. In the context of the issue of fiscal federalism, Blackorby and Brett [2000] show that production inefficiency is a characteristic of almost all (second-best) Pareto optima when the states control some taxes and the federal government controls others. Similarly, in an international setting, Keen and Wildasin [2004] show that when each country faces its own government’s budget constraint the Diamond-Mirrlees result no longer applies. In the dynamic model of the present paper, where the government can effect intertemporal
transfers by influencing the savings behavior of the private sector and by issuing bonds itself, we show that (effective) restrictions on the taxation of private savings entail production inefficiency at second-best Pareto optima. However, restrictions on government savings do not disturb the desirability of production efficiency.

Finally, it has been suggested that dynamic tax reform could be studied in a model in which agents live for more than one period and save for life cycle reasons. While this is certainly feasible, it would slightly complicate the model and simply change the motive for saving (from an altruistic bequest motive to saving for their own future consumption). Moreover, the fundamental issues addressed in this paper would remain the same, i.e., the process of tax reform cannot be analyzed as a sequence of static economies as a reform in one period will affect savings and therefore endowments, equilibrium, and welfare in subsequent periods.
FIGURE 1

The Geometry of Proposition 1 and its Corollaries

E.g. 1: There exists an equilibrium preserving reform that makes generation 1 better-off (shaded area), but generations 2 and 3 are made worse-off.

\[ -P(\Gamma) = \{dP : \nabla ZdP \leq 0\} \]

\[ \{dP : \nabla V_1dP > 0\} \]

E.g. 2: There exists an equilibrium preserving and Pareto improving reform.

\[ \{dP : \nabla ZdP \leq 0 \& \nabla V_i dP > 0 \ \forall \ i\} \]
FIGURE 2

Social Welfare and Political Constraints

$W(V^1, V^2, V^3)$

First-best Pareto frontier

Second-best Pareto frontier

Political constraint

No tax equilibrium
Appendix

(I)  **Farkas’ Theorem.**

Let $A$ be an $a \times n$ matrix and let $b$ be an $n$-dimensional vector. Then either

$$Ax \leq 0^{(a)} \quad bx > 0$$

has a solution $x$, where $x$ is an $n$-dimensional vector, or

$$\lambda A = b$$

has a solution $\lambda \geq 0^{(a)}$, where $\lambda$ is an $a$-dimensional vector, but never both.

**Motzkin’s Theorem of the Alternative.**

Let $A$, $B$, and $C$ be $a \times n$, $b \times n$, and $c \times n$ matrices. Then either

$$Ax \gg 0^{(a)} \quad Bx \geq 0^{(b)} \quad Cx = 0^{(c)}$$

has a solution $x$, where $x$ is an $n$-dimensional vector, or

$$\lambda_1 A + \lambda_2 B + \lambda_3 C = 0^{(n)} \quad \lambda_1 > 0^{(a)}, \lambda_2 \geq 0^{(b)}, \lambda_3 \text{ unrestricted}$$

has a solution $\lambda_1$, $\lambda_2$, and $\lambda_3$, where $\lambda_1$, $\lambda_2$, and $\lambda_3$ are $a$-dimensional, $b$-dimensional, and $c$-dimensional vectors, but never both.

Further details on the above theorems can be found in Mangasarian [1969].

(II)  **Proof of Corollary 2.1.**

Subtracting the first equation in (4.1) from the second yields:

$$\langle \mu_1, \ldots, \mu_n \rangle \nabla_{\rho'} \chi_1 + \mu_{n+1} \nabla_{\rho'} \ell_1 - \mu_{n+3} \nabla_{\rho'} L_1 = 0^{(a)} \quad (A.1)$$

Subtracting the third equation in (4.1) from the fourth yields:

$$\langle \mu_1, \ldots, \mu_n \rangle \nabla_{\rho'} \chi_1 + \mu_{n+1} \nabla_{\rho'} k_1 - \mu_{n+3} \nabla_{\rho'} L_1 = 0 \quad (A.2)$$

Subtracting the fifth equation in (4.1) from the sixth yields:
\begin{align}
\langle \mu_1, \ldots, \mu_n \rangle \nabla_w x_1 + \mu_{n+1} \nabla_w k_1 - \mu_{n+3} \nabla_w L_1 &= 0 \\
(A.3)
\end{align}

Combining (A.1) – (A.3) yields:
\begin{align}
\langle \mu_1, \ldots, \mu_n, \mu_{n+1}, \mu_{n+3} \rangle \nabla_{\hat{p}} \hat{x}_1 &= 0^{(n+2)} \\
(A.4)
\end{align}

where \( \hat{x}_1 \) combines the supply of \( x_1, k_1, \) and \( L_1 \), and \( \hat{p}^1 \) combines the producer prices \( p^1, r^1, \) and \( w^1 \).

Next, it follows from homogeneity of degree zero of \( x_1(p^1, r^1, w^1), k_1(p^1, r^1, w^1), \) and \( L_1(p^1, r^1, w^1) \) in producer prices that:
\begin{align}
\nabla_{\hat{p}} \hat{x}_1 \langle p_1^1, \ldots, p_n^1, r^1, w^1 \rangle &= 0^{(n+2)} \\
(A.5)
\end{align}

It now follows from (A.4), (A.5), and symmetry of the Hessian of the profit function \( \psi_1(p^1, r^1, w^1) \) that \( \langle \mu_1, \ldots, \mu_n, \mu_{n+1}, \mu_{n+3} \rangle = \eta \langle p_1^1, \ldots, p_n^1, r^1, w^1 \rangle \) for some scalar \( \eta > 0 \).

That is, first-period social shadow prices are proportional to first-period producer prices.

In a similar manner, it can be shown that second- and third-period social shadow prices are proportional to second- and third-period producer prices.

\section*{(III) Proof of Proposition 3}

The proof is analogous to that of Corollary 2.1, except subtracting the third equation in (5.1) from the fourth yields:
\begin{align}
\langle \mu_1, \ldots, \mu_n \rangle \nabla_j x_1 + \mu_{n+1} \nabla_j k_1 - \mu_{n+3} \nabla_j L_1 &= \theta_1 \\
(A.2')
\end{align}

The expression corresponding to (A.4) becomes:
\begin{align}
\langle \mu_1, \ldots, \mu_n, \mu_{n+1}, \mu_{n+3} \rangle \nabla_{\hat{p}} \hat{x}_1 &= \langle 0^{(n)}, \theta_1, 0 \rangle \\
(A.4')
\end{align}
From (A.4') and (A.5) it follows that first-period social shadow prices are proportional to first-period producer prices if and only if $\theta_1 = 0$, i.e., if and only if the constraint preventing increases in first-period savings taxation is not binding. In a similar manner, it can be shown that production efficiency holds in the second period if and only if $\theta_2 = 0$, i.e., if and only if the constraint preventing increases in second-period savings taxation is not binding.

(IV) Proof of Proposition 4.

Requiring that the government balance its budget period-by-period requires that the following restrictions be placed on its bond issues: $db_1 + b_1 = 0$, $db_2 + b_2 = 0$, $dB_2 + B_2 = 0$, and $dB_3 + B_3 = 0$. There exists an equilibrium preserving and Pareto improving reform with the government’s budget balanced period-by-period if and only if there exists a solution $dP$ to the following non-homogenous system:

$$\nabla Z dP \leq 0^{(3n+11)} \quad \nabla V dP \gg 0^{(3)} \quad \begin{pmatrix} 0^{(2n+4)} & 1 & 0^{(4n+14)} \\ 0^{(4n+11)} & 1 & 0^{(2n+7)} \\ 0^{(4n+12)} & 1 & 0^{(2n+6)} \\ 0^{(6n+17)} & 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} b_1 \\ -b_2 \\ -B_2 \\ -B_3 \end{pmatrix} = (A.6)$$

The non-homogenous system (A.6) has a solution $dP$ if and only if the following homogeneous system (A.7) has a solution $(dP, D)$, where $D$ is a dummy variable used to convert the non-homogenous system (A.6) into the homogeneous system (A.7).

$$\begin{pmatrix} \nabla Z & 0^{(3n+11)} \\ D \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} dP \\ D \end{pmatrix} \leq 0^{(3n+11)} \quad \begin{pmatrix} \nabla V & 0^{(3)} \\ 0^{(6n+19)} & 1 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} dP \\ D \end{pmatrix} \gg 0^{(4)}$$
(A.7)

By Motzkin’s Theorem, if there is no solution \( \langle dP, D \rangle \) to (A.7), then there exist vectors \( \langle \lambda, \xi \rangle > 0^{(4)}, \mu \geq 0^{(3n+11)} \), and \( \theta \) unrestricted such that:

\[
(\lambda \quad \xi)
\begin{pmatrix}
\nabla V & 0^{(3)} \\
0^{(6n+19)} & 1
\end{pmatrix}
+ \theta
\begin{pmatrix}
0^{(2n+4)} & 1 & 0^{(4n+14)} & b_1 \\
0^{(4n+11)} & 1 & 0^{(2n+7)} & b_2 \\
0^{(4n+12)} & 1 & 0^{(2n+6)} & B_2 \\
0^{(6n+17)} & 1 & 0 & B_3
\end{pmatrix}
= \mu
\begin{pmatrix}
\nabla Z & 0^{(3n+11)}
\end{pmatrix}
\]

(A.8)

The only differences between (A.8) and the unrestricted conditions for second-best optimality contained in (4.1) are that \( \theta_1, \theta_2, \theta_3, \) and \( \theta_4 \) are added, respectively, to the 7th, 16th, 17th, and 24th equations in (4.1), and an additional condition:

\[
\xi + \theta_1 b_1 + \theta_2 b_2 + \theta_3 B_2 + \theta_4 B_3 = 0
\]

is introduced. However, none of these changes affect the equations required to prove production efficiency (see the proof of Corollary 2.1). Therefore, restrictions on the government’s debt instruments do not affect the desirability of production efficiency.

(V) **Defining the Matrices and Vectors.**

The Jacobian matrix \( \nabla Z \) is obtained by stacking the following matrices \( \nabla Z^1, \nabla Z^2, \) and \( \nabla Z^3 \), which correspond to the first-, second-, and third-period market clearing equations.
\[ \nabla Z^1 := \begin{pmatrix}
\nabla_{\pi} x_1 - \nabla_{\rho} x_1 & \nabla_{\pi} x_1 - \nabla_{\rho} x_1 & \nabla_{\pi} x_1 - \nabla_{\rho} x_1 & \nabla_{\pi} x_1 - \nabla_{\rho} x_1 & \nabla_{\rho} x_1 - \nabla_{\omega} x_1 & \nabla_{\rho} x_1 - \nabla_{\omega} x_1 \\
\nabla_{\pi} k_1 - \nabla_{\rho} k_1 & \nabla_{\pi} k_1 - \nabla_{\rho} k_1 & \nabla_{\pi} k_1 - \nabla_{\rho} k_1 & \nabla_{\pi} k_1 - \nabla_{\rho} k_1 & \nabla_{\rho} k_1 - \nabla_{u} k_1 & \nabla_{\rho} k_1 - \nabla_{u} k_1 \\
\nabla_{\pi} b^1 & \nabla_{\pi} b^1 & \nabla_{\pi} b^1 & \nabla_{\pi} b^1 & \nabla_{\rho} b^1 & \nabla_{\omega} b^1 \\
\nabla_{\pi} l^1 + \nabla_{\rho} L_1 & \nabla_{\pi} l^1 & \nabla_{\pi} l^1 + \nabla_{\rho} L_1 & \nabla_{\rho} l^1 & \nabla_{\rho} l^1 + \nabla_{u} L_1 & \nabla_{\omega} l^1 \\
\end{pmatrix} \sim \\
\begin{pmatrix}
0^{(a)} & 0^{(a)} & 0^{(a)} & 0^{(a)} & 0^{(a)} & 0^{(a)} & 0^{(a)} & 0^{(a)} & 0^{(a)} & 0^{(a)} & 0^{(a)} & 0^{(a)} & 0^{(a)} \\
0 & 0^{(a)} & 0^{(a)} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0^{(a)} & 0^{(a)} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
\end{pmatrix} \sim \\
\begin{pmatrix}
0^{(a)} & 0^{(a)} & 0^{(a)} & 0^{(a)} & 0^{(a)} & 0^{(a)} & 0^{(a)} & 0^{(a)} & 0^{(a)} & 0^{(a)} & 0^{(a)} & 0^{(a)} & 0^{(a)} \\
0^{(a)} & 0^{(a)} & 0^{(a)} & 0^{(a)} & 0^{(a)} & 0^{(a)} & 0^{(a)} & 0^{(a)} & 0^{(a)} & 0^{(a)} & 0^{(a)} & 0^{(a)} & 0^{(a)} \\
0^{(a)} & 0^{(a)} & 0^{(a)} & 0^{(a)} & 0^{(a)} & 0^{(a)} & 0^{(a)} & 0^{(a)} & 0^{(a)} & 0^{(a)} & 0^{(a)} & 0^{(a)} & 0^{(a)} \\
\end{pmatrix} \nabla_{\rho} x_1 \\
\nabla_{\rho} k_1 \\
\nabla_{\rho} b^1 \\
\nabla_{\rho} l^1 \\
\end{pmatrix} \sim \\
\begin{pmatrix}
\nabla_{\pi} x_2 & \nabla_{\pi} x_2 & \nabla_{\pi} x_2 & \nabla_{\pi} x_2 & \nabla_{\pi} x_2 & 0^{(n)} & \nabla_{\pi} x_2 - \nabla_{\rho} x_2 \\
\nabla_{\pi} k_2 & \nabla_{\pi} k_2 & \nabla_{\pi} k_2 & \nabla_{\pi} k_2 & \nabla_{\pi} k_2 & 0 & \nabla_{\pi} k_2 - \nabla_{\rho} k_2 \\
\nabla_{\pi} b^2 & \nabla_{\pi} b^2 & \nabla_{\pi} b^2 & \nabla_{\pi} b^2 & \nabla_{\pi} b^2 & 0 & \nabla_{\pi} b^2 \\
\nabla_{\pi} l^2 & \nabla_{\pi} l^2 & \nabla_{\pi} l^2 & \nabla_{\pi} l^2 & \nabla_{\omega} l^2 & 0 & \nabla_{\pi} l^2 + \nabla_{\rho} L_2 \\
-\nabla_{\pi} k^1 & -\nabla_{\pi} k^1 & -\nabla_{\pi} k^1 & -\nabla_{\pi} k^1 & -\nabla_{\omega} k^1 & 0 & \nabla_{\pi} K_2 \\
-\nabla_{\pi} b^1 & -\nabla_{\pi} b^1 & -\nabla_{\pi} b^1 & -\nabla_{\pi} b^1 & -\nabla_{\omega} b^1 & 0 & 0^{(n)} \\
\end{pmatrix} \sim \\
\begin{pmatrix}
\nabla_{\pi} x_2 - \nabla_{\rho} x_2 & \nabla_{\rho} x_2 & \nabla_{\rho} x_2 - \nabla_{\omega} x_2 & \nabla_{\rho} x_2 - \nabla_{\omega} x_2 & \nabla_{\rho} x_2 - \nabla_{\omega} x_2 & 0^{(n)} & \nabla_{\rho} x_2 - \nabla_{\pi} x_2 \\
\nabla_{\pi} k_2 - \nabla_{\rho} k_2 & \nabla_{\pi} k_2 - \nabla_{\rho} k_2 & \nabla_{\pi} k_2 - \nabla_{\rho} k_2 & \nabla_{\pi} k_2 - \nabla_{\rho} k_2 & \nabla_{\pi} k_2 - \nabla_{\omega} k_2 & 0 & \nabla_{\pi} k_2 - \nabla_{\rho} k_2 \\
\nabla_{\pi} b^2 & \nabla_{\pi} b^2 & \nabla_{\pi} b^2 & \nabla_{\pi} b^2 & \nabla_{\pi} b^2 & 0 & \nabla_{\pi} b^2 \\
\nabla_{\pi} l^2 + \nabla_{\rho} L_2 & \nabla_{\pi} l^2 & \nabla_{\pi} l^2 + \nabla_{\rho} L_2 & \nabla_{\omega} l^2 & \nabla_{\omega} l^2 & 0 & \nabla_{\pi} l^2 + \nabla_{\rho} L_2 \\
0^{(n)} & \nabla_{\pi} K_2 & 0 & \nabla_{\rho} K_2 & 0 & 0 & \nabla_{\omega} K_2 \\
0^{(n)} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
\end{pmatrix} \sim \\
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The gradients of the consumers’ indirect utility functions (with respect to \( dP \)) are given by:

\[
\nabla V^3 := \langle \nabla_{\sigma^1} x^2, \nabla_{\sigma^2} x^2, \nabla_{\sigma^3} x^2, \nabla_{\rho^1} x^3, \nabla_{\rho^2} x^3, \nabla_{\rho^3} x^3, \nabla_{\omega^1} x^3, \nabla_{\omega^2} x^3, \nabla_{\omega^3} x^3, 0^{(n)} \rangle
\]
\[ \nabla V^2 := \langle \nabla_{\pi}, V^2, \nabla_{\pi}, V^2, \nabla_{\rho_1}, V^2, \nabla_{\rho_2}, V^2, \nabla_{\omega_1}, V^2, \nabla_{\omega_2}, V^2, 0, \nabla_{\pi}, V^2, \nabla_{\pi}, V^2, \nabla_{\rho_1}, V^2, \nabla_{\rho_2}, V^2, \nabla_{\omega_1}, V^2, \nabla_{\omega_2}, V^2, 0^{(2n+7)}, \nabla_R V^2 \rangle \]

\[ \nabla V^3 := \langle \nabla_{\pi}, V^3, \nabla_{\pi}, V^3, \nabla_{\rho_1}, V^3, \nabla_{\rho_2}, V^3, \nabla_{\omega_1}, V^3, \nabla_{\omega_2}, V^3, 0, \nabla_{\pi}, V^3, \nabla_{\pi}, V^3, \nabla_{\rho_1}, V^3, \nabla_{\rho_2}, V^3, \nabla_{\omega_1}, V^3, \nabla_{\omega_2}, V^3, \nabla_{\sigma}, V^3, \nabla_{\sigma}, V^3, \nabla_{\sigma}, V^3, \nabla_{\sigma}, V^3, \nabla_{\sigma}, V^3, 0, \nabla_R V^3 \rangle \]

The gradient of the social welfare function (with respect to \(dP\)) is given by:

\[ \nabla W := \langle \lambda_1 \nabla_{\pi}, V^1 + \lambda_2 \nabla_{\pi}, V^2 + \lambda_3 \nabla_{\pi}, V^3, \lambda_4 \nabla_{\pi}, V^4, \lambda_1 \nabla_{\rho_1}, V^1 + \lambda_2 \nabla_{\rho_1}, V^2 + \lambda_3 \nabla_{\rho_1}, V^3, \lambda_1 \nabla_{\omega_1}, V^1 + \lambda_2 \nabla_{\omega_1}, V^2 + \lambda_3 \nabla_{\omega_1}, V^3, \lambda_1 \nabla_{\omega_2}, V^1 + \lambda_2 \nabla_{\omega_2}, V^2 + \lambda_3 \nabla_{\omega_2}, V^3, 0, \lambda_2 \nabla_{\pi}, V^2 + \lambda_3 \nabla_{\pi}, V^3, \lambda_2 \nabla_{\rho_1}, V^2 + \lambda_3 \nabla_{\rho_1}, V^3, \lambda_2 \nabla_{\rho_2}, V^2 + \lambda_3 \nabla_{\rho_2}, V^3, \lambda_2 \nabla_{\omega_1}, V^2 + \lambda_3 \nabla_{\omega_1}, V^3, \lambda_2 \nabla_{\omega_2}, V^2 + \lambda_3 \nabla_{\omega_2}, V^3, \lambda_2 \nabla_{\sigma}, V^2 + \lambda_3 \nabla_{\sigma}, V^3, \lambda_2 \nabla_{\sigma}, V^2 + \lambda_3 \nabla_{\sigma}, V^3, \lambda_2 \nabla_{\sigma}, V^2 + \lambda_3 \nabla_{\sigma}, V^3, \lambda_2 \nabla_{\sigma}, V^2 + \lambda_3 \nabla_{\sigma}, V^3, \lambda_2 \nabla_{\sigma}, V^2 + \lambda_3 \nabla_{\sigma}, V^3, \lambda_3 \nabla_{\sigma}, V^3, 0, \lambda_4 \nabla_{\pi}, V^1 + \lambda_5 \nabla_{\pi}, V^2 + \lambda_6 \nabla_{\pi}, V^3 \rangle \]

where:

\[ \lambda_i = \frac{\partial W(\cdot)}{\partial V^i} \]

is the welfare weight of generation \(i\).
References


Weymark, J [1979], “A Reconciliation of Recent Results in Optimal Taxation”, *Journal of Public Economics*, 7, 171-190.