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Are the Central and Eastern European Transition Countries Results from a Multivariate Logit Analysis still vulnerable to a Financial Crisis?

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Abstract

the build up of the crisis potential in Central and Eastern Europe. by banks, which played a key role in the history of the Asian crises, was not an important factor in of real appreciation of the currency relative to a trend, and v) the change in exports. Short-term debt to GDP; ii) the ratio of the budget deficit to GDP; iii) the change in currency reserves; iv) the amount which contribute positively to the probability of a crisis are: i) the ratio of the current account deficit explain the occurrence of crises with only a small number of macroeconomic variables. The variables into account the rare event characteristic of a currency crisis. Our results suggest that it is possible to countries in Central and Eastern Europe with a modified logit model. The modification takes explicitly The aim of the paper is to analyse the determinants of financial crises in a sample of nine transition

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1. Introduction

lived through severe crises recently. to the EU as well as in Turkey and Russia, two important countries of the region who have causes of financial crises in several of the Central and Eastern European candidate countries of crises in the emerging markets in Central and Eastern Europe. Our focus is to highlight the financial crises. This paper builds upon this work and attempts to fill the gap on the origins the IMF, who developed a probit approach to assess the vulnerability of different countries to emerging economies in Asia and Latin America. Important work in this area was done by and subsequently the outbreak of a financial crises. Much of the research has centered on the research effort into the underlying factors and causes driving the build-up of economic distress occurrence of both a currency and a banking crisis – in the last years has lead to an intensified The increased frequency of severe financial crises – i.e. the more or less contemporaneous

sample except Russia have experienced an appreciation of the real exchange rate against the due to the crawling peg regime appreciated least, by only 13~% over the observation period. September 1998 the Russian rouble also appreciated by almost 25 %. The Hungarian Forint Euro. With more than 30 % it was the strongest for Latvia, Romania and Turkey. able current account deficits. During the period from 1996 through 2000 all countries in our Consequently, the real appreciation led to a decline in exports' competitiveness and to sizerate appreciation in several countries which was not matched equally by productivity gains. presence of a fixed – or predetermined – nominal exchange rate, resulted in a real exchange sequent establishment of macroeconomic stability. However, inflationary persistence in the anchor provided an effective device for guiding the disinflation programmes and for the subtion countries introduced a fixed or predetermined exchange rate system. The exchange rate At the beginning of the transformation process in the early 1990's several transforma-

short-term speculative inflows (Razin/Sadka/Yuen, 1996). With the accession to the OECD, institutions for assistance as it would hamper their chances of a rapid accession. On the other akward position: On one hand, they cannot simply turn to the IMF or other international capital, it also exposed the countries to the risk of a sudden and massive reversal of capital the opening of the capital account is generally beneficial as it enables a better allocation of Slovak Republic (October 2000) had to open their capital accounts by accepting the OECD the Czech Republic (December 1995), Hungary (May 1996), Poland (July 1996), and the Here, the Central and Eastern Codes of Liberalisation of Capital Movements and Current Invisible Operations. The fixed exchange rate regimes changed the pecking order of capital inflows in favour of Once a crisis happens, its resolution often requires international financial assistance European countries (henceforth CEE countries) are in an Although

an orderly accession. the accession candidates have to be very careful of not running into trouble if they strive for hand, the EU has no obligations whatsoever to help out non-members. As a consequence,

policy options for the transition countries in the wake of accession to the European Union. mance of the model. The usefulness of the logit model as an early warning system for crises results are presented in section six, which is followed by an analysis of the forecasting perforthe estimation method and provide a description of the explanatory variables. The empirical tinguishing crisis periods from tranquil periods is presented. Sections four and five outline on previous examined in section eight. The final section draws some conclusions and outlines a few The rest of the paper is structured as follows. studies on the origins of currency crises. The next section provides a brief survey In section three the criterion for dis-

2. Survey of the Literature

into the origins of these crises. The economic theory on the causes of currency devided into three generations of models – named according to the chronological development Numerous currency crises in the second half of 1990s have stimulated economic research crises can be

policies which are inconsistent with the fixed exchange rate. In Krugman's seminal paper the Ultimately, the abandoning of the peg is inevitable. The subsequent real appreciation leads to a current account deficit and diminishing reserves. fiscal deficit. With unchanged money demand this necessarily results in inflationary pressure. driving force is an expansionary monetary policy which is rooted in the monetisation of In the first-generation models (Krugman, 1979) a currency crisis occurs due to economic

the fixed exchange rate. Thus, it is optimal for the country to abandon the pegof foregone growth or higher unemployment, may outweigh the advantages of maintaining interest rate to defend the fixed exchange rate. But the ensuing costs, for instance, in terms nomic fundmentals appear to be sound. In case of a speculative attack a country raises of multiple equilibria. A currency can be subject to speculative attacks even if the macroeco-(1986). Central to these models is the element of self-fullfilling expectations and the existence The second-generation models originate in the work of Flood/Garber (1984) and Obstfeld

overlending and overborrowing behaviour of banks (McKinnon/Pill, 1997). the interaction are excessive short term debt and domestic credit by banks which reflect the rency crisis (Kaminsky/Reinhart, 1996; Kaminsky, 1998). The key variables responsible for companied by a currency and maturity mismatch. The causal relationship between a banking Third-generation models emphasise the interaction between a banking crisis and a cur-This is often ac-

is large enough the bank's liabilities can easily exceed the assets and force the bank into on behalf of the banks leave them vulnerable to currency depreciations. If the depreciation ceded by a currency crisis than the other way round. Large open foreign exchange positions and a currency crisis can run both ways, but in practice a banking crisis is more often pre-

Kaminsky/Lizondo/Reinhart (1998) and Goldstein/Kaminsky/Reinhart (2000). the level of vulnerability of a country for a crisis. Examples of this type of model include can be summarised in a composite indicator and the level of the indicator then determines guish between a normal and a signaling behaviour of a variable. The number of signals behaviour in the time series of various macroeconomic variables prior to the outbreak of a first goes back Kaminsky/Reinhart (1996). Its basic idea is to find some sort of anomolous On the empirical research side on currency crises two different strands have emerged: The By defining a threshold for each of the reviewed variables, it is possible tο

(DCSD) can be found in Berg et al. (1999) and Berg/Patillo (1999a,b,c). IMF as well. A detailed description of the IMF's Developing Country Studies Division Model 20 countries for the year 1995 to examine how strongly these countries were affected by the from 1971 through 1992, was motivated by the Mexico crisis in 1994. They examine a panel of 105 developing countries to characterize common causes of many currency crises. The analysis by Frankel/Rose (1996) green/Rose/Wyplosz (1996) who used data from 1959 through 1993 for industrial countries using a logit or probit type of model. One of the first studies in this field was done by Eichen-The second strand of research tries to capture the causes of crises in terms of probability by The probit type model plays an important role in country risk analysis of the while Radelet/Sachs (1998) undertook a cross-country analysis of

good indicators for upcoming speculative attacks and an appreciation of the real exchange rate precipate most financial crises and are therefore Common to both strands of research is the finding that falling foreign exchange reserves

3. Periods of Speculative Pressure

and widely used instrument to determine crisis periods is the Exchange Market Pressure rate, the short-term interest rate, and the currency reserves. index (henceforth EMP index) suggested by Eichengreen/Rose/Wyplosz bility potential, it is necessary to distinguish crisis periods from tranquil periods. An useful In order to identify the variables and factors responsible for a build up of a certain vulnera-The EMP index represents the weighted sum of changes in the nominal exchange The basic idea of the index (1996, henceforth

incorporate unsuccessful speculative attacks. a combination of the two measures. The main advantage of the index is that it manages to option to defend the own currency by selling foreign reserves or by raising interest rates or index crosses a certain threshold. This reflects the fact that a central bank has generally the is that a period of speculative pressure - or synonymously a crisis - is called as soon as the

formally defined as: exchange rate is consequently defined vis-à-vis the Euro. The EMP index of country i is CEE countries (except for Turkey). Since most of the trade is factorised in Euro the nominal is chosen as the reference country as it is by far the largest single trading partner for the relative to a reference country. For our purposes Germany (denoted with the subscript G) To take into account economic circumstances, the changes in the variables are measured

$$EMP_{i,t} = \alpha \Delta e_{i,t} - \beta \Delta (r_{i,t} - r_{G,t}) + \gamma \Delta (i_{i,t} - i_{G,t}), \tag{1}$$

are weighted equally.¹ to take account of possible volatility shifts. For simplicity reasons the parameters - α , β , γ three variables (exchange rate, reserves, and interest rate) are normalised by their variance α, β , and γ are the weights of the three policy options and sum up to unity. In addition, the reserves to GDP, i_i the short term interest rate, and t being the time index. with $e_{i,t}$ being the nominal exchange rate vis-à-vis the Euro; $r_{i,t}$ the ratio of currency The parameters

month is declared a crisis month. Here we follow ERW (1996) and call a crisis if the index between crisis and tranquil periods. If the index crosses a certain threshold the corresponding deviates by more than one and half standard deviations from its mean, i.e. After having calculated the EMP index for each country it is possible to distinguish

$$y_{i,t} = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{otherwise} \\ 1 & \text{if} & EMP_{i,t} \ge \mu_{EMP_i} + 1.5\sigma_{EMP_i} \end{cases}$$
 (2)

index, respectively. where μ_{EMP} and σ_{EMP} denote the sample mean and the standard deviation of the EMP

 $^{^1}$ Different weighting schemes such as 50%, 30%, 20% did not yield substantially different results compared to the one applied (33%, 33%, 33%).

signals speculative pressure only few months after the abandoning of the exchange rate peg (see Figure 1). To account for the slow adjustment behaviour, the index is led by six months. of the Czech currency crisis in May 1997 and the Russian crisis in August 1998 the index The EMP index does not always coincide with periods of currency realignments. In case

prior to this event. the threshold the corresponding month is declared a crisis month as well as the eleven months estimation, we define a crisis period in the following way: As soon as the EMP index crosses an event may build up over months. Usually, a financial crisis is a sudden event, although the pressure culminating in such In order to reflect this behaviour adequately in our

4. Estimation Methodology and Data

4.1. Logit Analysis

crisis-triggering factors and a crisis can be expressed as follows: an overvalued exchange rate and other variables. explained by a number of factors, such as the current account deficit, the budget deficit, Economic theory and historical experience indicates that the occurrence of a crisis can be Formally, the relationship between the

$$Pr(crisis_{i,t}) = \pi_i(y_{i,t} = 1 \mid \mathbf{X}_t, \beta_t) = F(\mathbf{X}_t, \beta_t)$$
(3)

Specifically, we assume for the estimation a cumulative logistic distribution function as the the outbreak of a crisis, i.e. functional form for the relationship between the explanatory variables and the probability of where X_t is a set of explanatory variables and β_t is a vector of parameters to be estimated.

$$\pi_i(y_{i,t}) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-\beta' \mathbf{X}_{i,t}}},$$
(4)

where y_i is a dichotomous variable as defined in equation (2).

corrected. Its main idea is briefly sketched in the next section. 2 non-event, [P(Y=0)], is overestimated. Therefore, this so-called rare event bias has to be event, [P(Y=1)], in a logistic regression is underestimated and hence, the probability of the King/Zeng (2001a, 2001b) have shown that with such a set up the probability of the crisis

An elaborated description of the bias, the correction, and the proofs can be found in King/Zeng (2001b).

4.2. Rare Event Bias

equation (4), β , is biased in finite samples and this bias may be amplified by rare events. crisis periods are quite seldom (or ones in the binary case). In general, the estimate of β in with a limited dependent variable that while there are numerous tranquil periods (or zeros) acterise such a phenomenon as a rare event. This means in terms of estimating a model A financial crisis - like an earthquake - happens very rarely, it is therefore justified to char-

set to 1, the bias in the estimated constant term $\hat{\beta}_0$, can then be approximated as mated. For the special case with a constant term and just one explanatory variable which is The bias correction is done in two steps. In a first step the finite sample bias is approxi-

$$E(\widehat{\beta}_0 - \beta_0) \approx \frac{\overline{\pi} - 0.5}{n\overline{\pi}(1 - \overline{\pi})} \,, \tag{5}$$

estimate $\hat{\beta}_0$ is too small and as a consequence, $\Pr(Y=1)$ is underestimated. less than .5. Since the numerator is negative the entire bias term is negative. Therefore, the where $\overline{\pi}$ $=(1/n)\sum_{i=1}^n \pi_i$ and where it is assumed that a rare event has a probability of

less biased estimate $\hat{\beta}$. The probability can be calculated with the less biased $\hat{\beta}$ as: In a second step the probability calculations are adjusted for the sampling error of the

$$\widetilde{\pi}_0 = \Pr(Y_0 = 1 \mid \beta_0) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-\widetilde{\beta} \mathbf{x}_0}}$$
 (6)

the 'true' probability of the rare event involves a corrections factor, C_i : tainty about β or not, the size under the distribution increases for the same threshold. Hence Although the mean of the distribution stays the same, $\mu = x_i \tilde{\beta}$, whether ignoring the uncertaking into account the uncertainty about β results in a distribution with a greater variance. However, this still ignores the fact that $\widetilde{\beta}$ is estimated rather than known. Intuitively,

$$\Pr(Y_i = 1) \approx \widetilde{\pi}_i + C_i \tag{7}$$

with the correction factor

$$C_i = (0.5 - \widetilde{\pi}_i)\widetilde{\pi}_i(1 - \widetilde{\pi}_i)\mathbf{x}_0V(\widehat{\beta})\mathbf{x}_0'$$
(8)

simple; if $\widetilde{\beta}$ would be known C_i would become zero and conversely, the larger the uncertainty where V is the variance-covariance matrix. The intuition behind the correction is quite

about $\widetilde{\beta}$, the larger the correction factor.³

4.3. Data

Russia in August 1998, in Romania in February 1999, and in Turkey in November 2000. crises occurred, namely: in Bulgaria in January 1997, in the Czech Republic in May 1997, in with at most 108 observations for each country. During this period five episodes of financial Estonia, and Slovakia. The sample period runs from January 1996 through December 2001 Slovenia, and Turkey. The multivariate rare event logit (henceforth RE logit) estimation is done for nine countries. sample comprises: Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, For the out-of-sample estimation three countries are used: Croatia,

from Eurostat. All calculations were done with Stata 7.0. Euro are calculated using the Harmonised Consumer Price Index (HVPI), which is obtained for Election Systems (IFES). The real exchange rates of the national currencies vis-à-vis the from Standard & Poor's. The election data are obtained from the International Foundation are generated through linear interpolation. The sovereign credit ratings are readily available and the current account balance are only available on a quarterly basis, the monthly data capital flight are taken from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). Since data for GDP from the national statistical offices and national Central Banks. The data on foreign debt and national Economic Studies (WIIW). Data for the Baltic countries and Turkey are gathered The data for most countries are taken from the database of the Vienna Institute for Inter-

5. List of Explanatory Variables

group includes the sovereign credit rating and an election dummy which tries to capture the devaluation giving rise to a twin crisis phenomenon (Kaminsky/Reinhart, 1996). The third sector. These variables should reflect the size of the banking market and its vulnerability to a prise mainly macroeconomic variables. The second group of variables relates to the banking These variables are associated with the first and second generation of crisis models and comgroup relates to variables that are trying to capture the degree of distress in an economy. available on a timely basis. The variables can be broadly split into three groups. The first pirical literature on currency and banking crises, concentrating on those variables that are choice of possible explanatory variables is based on considerations of the theoretical and em-The tested variables comprise a wide range of macroeconomic and financial variables.

³ The programme code for the bias correction is implemented as an ADO-file in Stata and can be downloaded from the internet [http://gking.harvard.edu/files/relogit.zip].

of a sudden reversal of capital inflows. The list of explanatory variables is as follows: the credit rating as a reflection of market sentiment to a sovereign default indicates the risk phenomenon that the outbreak of a looming crisis is postponed until after the election while

is more vulnerable to a crisis when economic growth slows down (Hardy/Pazarbasioglu, 1998). Growth rate of GDP. Currency crises are often preceded by a recession. In general, an economy

the government's willingness to service its debt (Krugman, 1979). budget deficit can be expected before the eruption of a crisis as the higher deficit will impair vulnerability for a crisis and signals an unsustainable economic policy. A steady rise of the explanation for a currency crisis. A large budget deficit is a typical source of a country's Ratio of the Budget Balance to GDP. This indicator corresponds to the classic Krugman-type

to be judged unsustainable by the market participants (Corsetti/Pesenti/Roubini, 1998). account deficit for a longer period of time. Ultimately, the current account deficit may become because of the Balassa-Samuelson-effect it may not be sufficient to finance a rising current expected to experience some persistent productivity growth and terms-of-trade improvements Ratio of the Current Account Balance to GDP. Although emerging market economies can be

sis potential. Additionally, this variable indicates decreasing competitiveness and possible problems of domestic enterprises (Radelet/Sachs, 1998). Growth rate of Exports. Reduced exports inhibit a country's ability to earn foreign exchange finance an existing current account deficit. Thus, diminishing exports add to the

the better the cushion to defend a speculative attack against the currency (Feldstein, 1999). defend its currency, making a devaluation of the currency or the abandoning of the peg in case Growth rate of Currency Reserves. Diminishing currency reserves limit a country's ability speculative attack more likely. Conversely, the higher a country's international liquidity,

(Kaminsky/Lizondo/Reinhart, 1998). is defined as the negative deviation of the real exchange rate from the long term linear trend exports, growth prospects, and ultimately, a country's ability to service its debt. The variable an overvalued real exchange rate. A persistently overvalued currency has adverse effects on Overvaluation of the Real Exchange Rate. Usually, a currency crisis is closely linked to

nomic policy may lay the ground for future problems than a deficit financed by FDI. Hence, large PI inflows if not balanced by sound macroecobe liquidated if market sentiment changes and thus, are more easily reversed than long-term Growth Rate of Portfolio Investment Inflows. A current account deficit that is financed by extensive PI is therefore less sustainable Portfolio investment inflows (PI) can easily

payments as a consequence of the interest rate hike will put additional burden on the budget addition, if a country has accumulated a substantial amount of foreign debt higher interest in emerging market country This can induce a sharp and massive reversal of PI flows. (Kaminsky/Lizondo/Reinhart, 1998). World Interest Rate. A rise in the interest rate abroad may tilt the yield against investment

expected before a crisis (Demirgüc-Kunt/Detragiache, 1999). banking sector and begin to withdraw their savings. who are Ratio of the Bank Deposits to GDP. When a banking crisis is looming, domestic residents. usually better informed than foreigners, slowly loose faith in the stability Thus, a drop in bank deposits can be of the

balance sheet problems for the banks in form of non-performing loans (Mishkin, 1997). typically follow financial deregulation and the dismantling of capital controls. This may create can usually be observed. The main reason for this stylised fact lies in lending booms that Growth Rate of Domestic Credit. In the time leading up to a crisis a rapid credit expansion

abroad to finance the current account deficit is systematically underestimated by the banks are characterised as an 'over-borrowing syndrome', whereby the riskiness of borrowing from massive inflows of foreign capital can create macroeconomic imbalances that ultimately prove (McKinnon/Pill, 1997). Ratio of Short-term Foreign Debt to Currency Reserves. Following financial liberalisation, The opening of the capital account creates incentives for domestic banks which

drastic drop in value in course of a crisis is - besides tax evasion - a main motivation to shift over foreigners about domestic policy issues. Growth Rate of Capital Flight. Domestic residents have usually an information advantage The protection of assets against a sudden and

of a country's default (Kaminsky/Lizondo/Reinhart, 1998). sense sovereign credit ratings are often interpreted as an indicator capturing the likelihood conditions with which a country can borrow on the international capital markets. Credit Rating. Sovereign credit ratings play an important role in determining the terms and

incumbant government has strong incentives to surpress the outbreak of a crisis as it would event of a Presidential or Parliamentary election. With a nationwide election coming up, the devaluation will be postponed. In the end, the crisis happens shortly after the election, not Presidential/Parliamentary Elections. Quite often the timing of a crisis is closely linked to the (2001) based on the experience of some Latin American countries. their chances of getting re-elected. This hypothesis was advocated by Dornbusch A necessary corrective

following an election, otherwise it is 0. before. In order to take this phenomenon into account a 1 is assigned for the twelve months

6. Empirical Results

The results of the estimated logit models are presented in Table 2 specific model selection methodology keeping all variables that are significant at the 5% level. The candidate explanatory variables are successively eliminated by applying a general-to-

relative to its long term trend, and the current account and budget deficit is rising relative to increase in the log of the odds ratio, while keeping the other variables at their means. of a crisis. An increase in the deficit ratio by 1 percentage point would result in a 0.24 unit GDP. The current account to GDP ratio has the largest statistical impact on the probability when exports are declining, currency reserves are falling, the real exchange rate is overvalued with what we generally expect from economic theory. The probability of a crisis increases change in currency reserves, and the change in exports. The signs of all coefficients coincide the deviations of the real exchange rate from its trend, the budget balance to GDP ratio, the The resulting RE logit model comprises five variables: the current account to GDP ratio,

smaller variance. Thus, without correcting for the rare event characteristic of financial crises about a country's financial vulnerability. exports would have been dropped from the model, leaving out possible important information percent level whereas in the RE logit model the coefficient for exports has a considerably one important exception. In the ordinary logit model exports are only significant at the 12 very similar to the ones obtained from the ordinary logit model. Overall, the estimated coefficients from the rare event specification of the logit model However, there is

results in a significant way. differently and by including contemporaneous and lagged variables. None of them altered the to be statistically significant. to GDP ratio and between the real exchange rate and the budget deficit were not found construction of interaction terms between the real exchange rate and the current account was lost when used in combination with the other explanatory variables. some of the variables had predictive power when tested alone, their statistical significance Other than the five variables, none were found to be systematically significant. Although We tested the robustness of our results by defining variables Moreover,

in Summer 1997. the hypothesis that sovereign ratings anticipate banking and currency crises. consistent with the findings of Goldstein/Kaminsky/Reinhart (2000) for the Asian crises Two results stand out among the dropped variables: First, we fail to find evidence for If credit ratings are interpreted as a reflection of market expectations This

government tries to subdue tensions in the foreign exchange markets until after the elections parliamentary elections play an important role in the timing of a crisis has to be rejected for the Central and East European countries. warning of a looming crisis. participants. on a country's default probability then most crises came indeed as a surprise to market In this sense, the international debt markets do not provide much advance And second, Dornbusch's hypothesis (Dornbusch, No evidence is found that an incumbant 2001) that

7. Forecasting Performance

of-fit measures. The model was tested both in-sample as well as out-of-sample. In order to assess the forecasting performance of the model we considered various goodness-

7.1. Goodness of Fit Measures

denote the time series of realisations, where R_t equals one for the interval [t-12,t] if the EMP t and calculated from the estimated odds-ratio of the RE logit model. Furthermore, let R_t outcomes, as measured by the dichotomous (zero-one) variable (Diebold/Lopez, 1996). Let computed for t = 1, ..., T such that there are T values available for P_t and R_t index crosses its critical threshold at time t and equals zero otherwise. The probabilities are P_t be the time series of probability estimates, where P_t is the probability of a crisis at time The basic idea of the performance tests is to compare the probability estimates with the actual

observed realisations are the following: The most common tests to evaluate the closeness of the predicted probability and the

1. Quadratic Probability Score (QPS). The QPS is defined as:

$$QPS = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} 2(P_t - R_t)^2.$$
 (9)

A QPS test statistic with a score of 0 indicates perfect accuracy.

2. Log Probability Score (LPS). The LPS is given by:

$$LPS = -\frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \left[(1 - R_t) \ln(1 - P_t) + R_t \ln(P_t) \right]. \tag{10}$$

than under QPS The LPS differs from the QPS test that larger errors are penalised more heavily under LPS The LPS test statistic ranges from 0 to infinity, with 0 corresponding to perfect accuracy.

average predicted probability with the average realisation and is calculated as Global Squared Bias (GSB). The GSB measures forecast calibration. It compares the

$$GSB = 2(\overline{P}_t - \overline{R}_t)^2, \tag{11}$$

0 indicates a perfect match. with $\overline{P}_t = 1/T \sum_{t=i}^T P_i$ and $\overline{R}_t = 1/T \sum_{t=i}^T R_i$. The GSB lies between 0 and 2. Again, a

7.2. In-sample Performance

the model does better at the 10 % threshold when only 43 % of the crisis periods are misabout 80 % of the observations at the 20 % level. This is based almost entirely on the correct third of alarms are false, i.e. there is a signal but no crisis occurs within the next 12 months. classified. Despite the fact that only few crisis months are correctly anticipated, about two 12 months. The majority of crisis periods are missed at the 20 % threshold (57 %), although prediction of the tranquil periods. These are periods which are not followed by a crisis within presents the results for a cutoff probability of 10 % and 20 %. dicted probabilities with some cutoff probability above which a crisis is called. Table 3 To assess the forecasting performance we follow Berg/Patillo (1999) and compare the pre-The model correctly calls

assessments of a country's crisis vulnerability, which are based upon the RE logit model, are for a broad range of thresholds both in-sample and out-of-sample (see Table 4). Therefore, actual outcomes. The results of the χ^2 test show that the null hypothesis is strongly rejected forecasts for a binary event (in this case crisis and tranquil periods) are independent from the tionship between the forecasts and the realisations. The null hypothesis assumes that the In addition, we employ a χ^2 test of independence to check if there is a systematic rela-

a pure guess, i.e. Pr[crisis], is just 13 %. Pr[crisis | alarm], is correct in 31 % of all cases, whereas the chances of being correct with logit model and calls a crisis if the estimated probability is above a certain threshold, i.e. and unconditional probability of a crisis. A forecast of a crisis, which is based upon the RE the null hypothesis rejected. The results are confirmed by a comparison of the conditional old of the conditional probability. Only if the threshold is set very low, i.e. below 0.04, is statistically superior to random forecasts. This result holds for a wide range of the thresh-

sample estimation. The graph shows how the error probabilities change when the threshold one hand and the cutoff probability on the other hand. The errors are calculated for the in-Figure 3 depicts the relationship between committing either a Type I or a Type II error on fact that with a rising threshold the number of correctly recognised tranquil periods increases. higher the threshold the lower will be the probability of a Type II error. This follows from the I error because more and more actual crisis periods will be missed. And consequently, the higher the threshold before an alarm is issued the higher will be the probability of a Type varies. The two functions intersect at a threshold value of about 12 % which corresponds to probability of error of 32 %. The conditional probability of a crisis depends on the threshold level. Obviously, the

7.3. Out-of-sample Performance

predicted probabilities. countries. 1998 with the consequence that the forecasting performance is better than for truly unaffected contagion effects of the crises in the Czech Republic in May 1997 and in Russia in August as the in-sample countries. Thus, it was very likely that these countries experienced some countries are not included in the original sample, all three countries belong to the same region are done for Estonia, Croatia, and Slovenia. However, a caveat applies here: although the countries not included in the original sample. The out-of-sample probability calculations as reported in Table 2 together with the same explanatory variables, $\mathbf{X}_{i,t}$, to generate the To do out-of-sample tests we use the estimated coefficients, $\hat{\beta}$, of the RE logit regression These values can be interpreted as true probability forecasts

the 10 % threshold but barely half of all observations are correctly called. The QPS and the LPS also indicate a better fit out-of-sample than in-sample while for the calibration measure (GSB) the reverse is true. a crisis is concerned the RE logit model does partially better out-of-sample then it did The out-of-sample results are shown in Table 3. As far as the prediction of the timing Almost 90 % of all crisis period predictions are actually followed by a crisis at

8. Selecting the Optimal Threshold

crucial question is what probability is high enough for policy makers to be concerned about? After having estimated the probabilities of a crisis for various countries (see Figure 2) the This section presents a simple framework that allows to determine the optimal threshold.

8.1. The Loss Function of the Policy Maker

Let us assume the following cost matrix for the policy maker: To illustrate the decision problem for the policy maker it is useful to begin with an example.

Table 1: Cost Matrix for the Policy Maker

no crisis	crisis		
100	500	alarm	
0	1000	no alarm	

the highest. Of course, a necessary condition for an early warning system to be useful is that actions, the damage will be limited but exceeds the cost of the no-crisis scenario. However, if followed by tranquil periods we are in the best of all worlds. the cost are cut by half if timely actions are taken. If there are no alarms which are always it reduces the cost of a crisis substantially if appropriate actions are taken. In our example a crisis happens out of the blue - hitting the policy maker unprepared - the costs incurred are expense of crowding out capital investment. If there is a crisis, despite having taken proper run result in an increase in the interest rate thereby supporting the currency but also at the induce banks to reduce their lendings. Tighter fiscal and monetary policy will in the short which are costly. Higher minimum reserve requirements for banks, for instance, will likely advance to him. Each time there is an alarm the policy maker takes precautionary measures The costs in each scenario, which are expressed in units, are assumed to be fix and known in The matrix shows the cost for the policy maker for each of the four possible scenarios.

our example: (2000) and assume a simple loss function for the policy maker which is set up according to To determine the optimal cutoff probability we are following Demirgüc-Kunt/Detragiache

$$L = c_1(1 - \omega)T_2(\tau) + c_2\omega(1 - T_1(\tau)) + c_3\omega T_1(\tau), \tag{12}$$

scenario with $c_1 <$ where ω is the unconditional probability of a crisis, and c_i are the cost assigned to each C_2 $< c_3$. T_1 and T_2 are Type I and Type II errors, respectively, and are

the first scenario and c_1 is normalised to unity the loss function simplifies to government completely at a surprise (c_3) . If the costs are expressed in terms of the cost in (c_1) , the loss if the crisis hits the government prepared (c_2) , and the loss if a crisis strikes the the probability weighted sum of the loss if the government takes preventive measures in vain unconditional probability of an in-sample crisis, ω , is equal to 0.129. The loss function is derived from the in-sample estimation. Both types of errors depend on the threshold τ . The

$$L = (1 - \omega)T_2(\tau) + \gamma_1\omega(1 - T_1(\tau)) + \gamma_2\omega T_1(\tau), \tag{13}$$

policy maker. However, this applies only if the weights, i.e. the costs, are known in advance. moments do not matter. might no longer be risk neutral despite having a linear loss function where second and higher As soon as the policy maker can attach his own cost estimates to the different scenarios he with the weights γ_i such that $\gamma_2 > \gamma_1 > 1$. The linear loss function assumes a risk neutral

relative cost are simply the difference of the cost incurred in the worst case secenario and differentiation of equation (13) yields the influencing factors analytically total derivatives of the loss function are taken. the cost of the base line scenario. To determine the relationship between the threshold and unconditional probability of a crisis and second, the relative cost of an unexpected crisis. The optimal threshold for issuing warning signals will depend on two factors: First, the Implicit

$$\left. \frac{d\tau}{d\omega} \right|_{dL} = -\frac{\partial L/\partial\omega}{\partial L/\partial\tau} < 0 \tag{14}$$

the higher can be the threshold to call a crisis.⁴ a Type I error (and vice versa). By the same token, the rarer the event of a crisis becomes Clearly, the lower the probability of a crisis, the lower will be the probability of committing

The total derivative w.r.t. to the relative cost of a crisis is negative for reasonable values

$$\left. \frac{d\tau}{d\gamma_2} \right|_{dL} = -\frac{\partial L/\partial \gamma_2}{\partial L/\partial \tau} < 0 \tag{15}$$

becomes more worth while taking preventive measures. This confirms economic intuition: As the damage of an unexpected crisis is growing These measures are initiated in

For the derivation of the results see the Appendix.

accordance with a falling threshold. Since Type I errors are becoming more expensive the objective of the policy maker is to avoid them at reasonable costs.

the cost of the base scenario, a crisis is already called when the predicted probability reaches probability of a crisis exceeds 26 %. However when a Type I error is more costly, say 10 times crisis are 3 times the cost of taking preventive actions an alarm is issued when the predicted need to call a crisis and the cost of failing to anticipate a crisis. When the cost of missing a function is minimised. Obviously, there is an inverse relationship between the opportunity or case scenario. The function depicts all combinations of the cost parameters for which the loss are varying (γ_2) . Figure 4 shows the cutoff probability as a function of the cost in the worst γ_1 of the prepared-crisis scenario is set to 2 while the cost in case of an unexpected crisis cost parameters. For illustration purposes, the loss function is calculated for a specific configuration of the The parameter c_1 of the base scenario is normalised to 1 and the parameter

9. Conclusions

the rare event characteristic of a financial crisis. they also prove to be influential in causing financial crises in Central and Eastern for the outbreak of crises in Asian and Latin American countries. The aim was to see whether In this paper we tested a wide range of variables, which have previously been found significant To do this, we used a modified multivariate logit model which explicitly took into account

short-term foreign debt taken up by commercial banks in the build up of the crisis potential financial crises. models in explaining the financial crises in Central and Eastern Europe in the second half of in Asian and Latin America. In this respect, the CEE transition are akin to other emerging other determinants of a crisis in the CEE countries are similar to the driving forces for crises This feature seems to have been special to the Asian countries. Except for these factors, the export growth is slowing down. No evidence was found for the important role played by international reserves are low, when the real exchange rate has been overvalued, and when Speculative attacks tend to occur when the current account and fiscal deficits are high, when financial crises by focusing on the behaviour of a small number of macroeconomic variables Overall, our results support the strong empirical evidence in the literature that explains In sum, the analysis provides strong empirical support for the first generation The results of the RE logit model can also be used as an early warning system for The model has good prognostic quality rendering it better than pure guesses.

cerned our suggestions are threefold: far as recommendations for economic policy based on our empirical findings are con-First, the persistent current account deficits of the

importance of overvalued exchange rates as a driving force in the build up of crisis potential, prior to accession. A relatively high fiscal deficit could easily tilt the market sentiment against a speculative attack, illustrate the fact that the CEE economies are operating on the knife's Hungary and Poland have done so since 1999 European Monetary Union (ERM-II) and begin to reduce their current account deficits like candidates pick the right exchange rate when entering the exchange rate mechanism of the rate irrevocably to the Euro. Therefore, it is all the more important that the EU-accession to be a daunting task as the new EU member states have to peg eventually the exchange Central and Eastern European countries and maintaining it for a sufficiently long time seems exchange reserves. However, introducing more flexibility into the exchange rate system of the and the export earnings would enable the central bank to keep an adequate level of foreign time it would maintain the competitiveness of domestic enterprises on international markets This would avoid an excessively high real appreciation of the real exchange rate. At the same the EU-accession countries are well advised to make their exchange rate systems more flexible current account deficits in the Central and East European transformation countries and the change rate policy is the key to avoid a financial crisis. Against the background of persistent the domestic currency if the economy is already in precarious conditions. And third, the exbecause of the public expenditures to finance investments required to fullfil EU-obligations adequate fiscal deficit level. Fiscal surpluses are almost out reach for the transition countries demanded by the EU. Second, it is very important for the transition countries to maintain an on short-term portfolio flows (hot money) in the course of capital account liberalisation as the CEE countries were well advised to maintain some transitional periods for restrictions transition countries while keeping in mind that these deficits are a crucial factor in triggering Against the background of huge capital inflows to finance the current account deficits

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Appendix

Overview of the variables used in the estimation:

a) Budget Balance

$$\frac{\textit{Budget Balance}}{\textit{GDP}_t}*100$$

get monthly data. Source: WIIW. A budget deficit is has a (-) sign. The quarterly data for GDP are linearly interpolated to

b) GDP

$$\left[\frac{GDP_t}{GDP_{t-12}} - 1\right] * 100$$

interpolated to get monthly data. Source: WIIW. GDP is defined as the annual change in GDP. The quarterly data for GDP are linearly

c) Balance of the Current Account / GDP

$$\frac{Current\ Account_t}{GDP_t}*100$$

a 4-months moving average. Source: WIIW. A current account deficit is has a (-) sign. The quarterly data for the CA are linearly interpolated to get monthly data. Both current account balance and GDP are calculated as

d) Industrial Production

$$\left[\frac{Industrial\ Production_{t}}{Industrial\ Production_{t-12}} - 1\right]*100$$

Source: WIIW. Industrial production is defined as the annual change in industrial production.

e) Exports

$$\left[\frac{Exports_{t}}{Exports_{t-12}} - 1\right] * 100$$

deflated with the CPI index. Source: WIIW. Exports are defined as the annual change in real exports in local currency. Exports are

f) Imports

$$\left[\frac{Imports_{t}}{Imports_{t-12}} - 1\right] * 100$$

Imports are defined as the annual change in imports in local currency. Source: WIIW

g) Real Exchange Rate

$$REXR_t$$
 – linear $trend(REXR)$

trend points to an undervaluation. Source: WIIW. exchange from its long term linear trend. Conversely, a positive deviation from the linear An overvaluation of the real exchange rate is defined as a negative deviation of the real

h) Bank Deposits

$$\left[\frac{Bank \; Deposits_{t} \; / \; GDP_{t}}{Bank \; Deposits_{t-12} \; / \; GDP_{t-12}} - 1\right] * 100$$

Bank deposits are defined as the annual change in the ratio of bank deposits to GDP. Source: WIIW.

i) Currency Reserves

$$\frac{Currency \; Reserves_t}{GDP_t} * 100$$

Currency reserves are defined as the ratio of currency reserves to GDP. Source: WHW.

j) M2 / Currency Reserves

$$\left[\frac{M2_t \ / \ Reserves_t}{M2_{t-12} \ / \ Reserves_{t-12}} - 1\right] * 100$$

M2 to currency reserves is defined as the annual change in the ratio of M2 to currency reserves. Source: WIIW.

k) M2 Multiplier

$$\left[\frac{\textit{M2}_t \ / \textit{Money base}_t}{\textit{M2}_{t-12} \ / \textit{Money base}_{t-12}} - 1\right] * 100$$

The M2 multiplier is defined as the annual change in the ratio of M2 to the money base. Source: WHW.

l) Domestic Credit

$$\left[\frac{Domestic\ Credit_{t}\ /\ GDP}{Domestic\ Credit_{t-12}\ /\ GDP}_{t-12} - 1\right]*100$$

Source: WIIW Domestic credit is defined as the annual change in the domestic Credit-to-GDP-ratio.

m) Interest Rate Differential

Domestic Interest Rate_t ./. US-Interest Rate_t

Source: WIIW and Federal Reserve Economic Database (FRED). usually the lending rate, and the yield of 7-Year US-Treasury bonds with constant maturity The interest rate differential is defined as the difference between the domestic interest rate,

n World Interest Rate

US-Interest $Rate_t$

treasury bonds with constant maturity is chosen as the US interest rate. The US interest rate is used as a proxy for the world interest rate. The yield of 7-Year

Source: Federal Reserve Economic Database (FRED).

<u>o</u> Foreign Debt

$$\left[\frac{For eign\ Debt_{t}\ /\ GDP_{t}}{For eign\ Debt_{t-12}\ /\ GDP_{t-12}}-1\right]*100$$

Foreign debt is defined as total consolidated foreign claims of BIS-reporting banks on Source: BIS, Quarterly Review: International Banking and Financial Market Developments individual countries. The quarterly data are linearly interpolated to obtain monthly data.

p) Short term Foreign Debt / Foreign Debt

$$\begin{bmatrix} Short\ term\ Foreign\ Debt_t\ /\ Foreign\ Debt_t\ \\ \hline Short\ term\ Foreign\ Debt_{t-12}\ /\ Foreign\ Debt_{t-12}\ \\ \end{bmatrix}*100$$

with a maturity of up to 1 year. The quarterly data are linearly interpolated to obtain Short term foreign debt is defined as claims of BIS-reporting banks on individual countries monthly data.

Source: BIS, Quarterly Review: International Banking and Financial Market Developments

\mathbf{q} Capital Flight

$$\left[\frac{Deposits_{t}}{Deposits_{t-12}} - 1\right] * 100$$

a proxy for capital flight.

Source: BIS, Quarterly Review: International Banking and Financial Market Developments. The deposits by the non-bank private sector with foreign BIS-reporting banks are used as

\mathbf{r} Credit Rating


Source: Standard & Poor's, Sovereign Ratings History Since 1975. from 1 to 58 where 1 corresponds to AAA/stable and 58 to CC/stable, respectively. of sovereign issuers. The credit rating is transformed into whole numbers ranging The Credit Rating is defined as the Long Term Outlook of foreign currency credit rating

s) Presidential Elections

and the following eleven months and zero otherwise. or parliamentary elections. The election dummy is equal to 1 for the election month and Presidential Election are interpreted as nation-wide elections; either presidential

Source: International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES).

Figure 1: Exchange Market Pressure Index for Selected CEE Countries (Subset)



Source: Based on own calculations. Note: The shaded areas mark the 18-months window before a crisis.

Table 2: Estimates of the Logit Models

	0.099		0.097	Pseudo R ²
	710		710	Sample Size
-4.86	-2.058	-5.34	-2.093	Constant
-2.12	-0.009	-1.62	-0.009	Exports
-2.79	-0.131	-2.64	-0.131	Budget Deficit / GDP
-2.09	-0.034	-2.59	-0.035	Real Exchange Rate
-1.99	-0.048	-2.37	-0.049	Currency Reserves
-4.83	-0.229	-4.75	-0.235	Current Account / GDP
z statistic	Coefficient	z statistic	Coefficient	Variable
Event zit	Rare Event Logit	git	Logit	

Note: All coefficients are significant at the 5 % level except for Exports in the ordinary logit model. The coefficient of Exports is significant at the 12 % level.

Source: Own calulations.

Table 3: Goodness of Fit of the Rare Event Logit Model

	${\bf In\text{-}sample}^*$	${\rm Out\text{-}of\text{-}sample^{**}}$
$Goodness\ of\ Fit$		
Quadratic Probability Score (QPS)	0.202	0.169
Log Probability Score (LPS)	0.341	0.305
Global Squared Bias (GSB)	0.000014	0.0051
Cutoff Probability at 10 %		
Percent of observations correctly called	58.9	46.3
Percent of crises correctly called ^{a}	77.5	88.9
Percent of tranquil periods correctly called b	56.3	42.3
False alarms as a percent of total alarms ^{c}	79.5	87.5
Cutoff Probability at 20 %		
Percent of observations correctly called	81.6	79.0
Percent of crises correctly called a	42.7	16.7
Percent of tranquil periods correctly called b	87.1	81.7
False alarms as a percent of total alarms c	66.4	90.6
Memorandum		
Unconditional probability of a crisis (%)	12.92	9.26

^{*} In-sample countries: BU, CZ, HU, IV, LI, PL, RO, RU, SL, TR. ** Out-of-sample countries: ES, HR, SV.

Source: Own calculations, Table adapted from Berg/Patillo (1999b).

 $^{^{}a}$ A crisis period is correctly called when the estimated probability is above the cutoff probability and a crisis occurs within 12 months.

 $^{^{}b}$ A tranquil period is correctly called when the estimated probability is below the cutoff probability and no crisis occurs within 12 months.

 $[^]c$ A false alarm is an observation with an the estimated probability of crisis above the cutoff probability and no crisis occurs within 12 months.

Table 4: χ^2 test of independence


100.7*	103.6*	105.0*	109.3*	Out-of-sample
4.2*	15.4*	51.3*	54.9*	In sample
35 %	30 %	25 %	20 %	Threshold

Note: The χ^2 test statistic is asymptotic normally distributed. The null hypothesis is, that the forecasts and the actual outcomes

are independent. *means, that the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% significance level. The critical value for $\chi^2_{0.05}(1)$ is 3.841.

Source: Own calulations.


Figure 2: Estimated Probabilities of a Crisis (in-sample)



Note: The shaded areas mark the crisis month.

Source: Based on own calculations.

Figure 2: cont.



Note: The shaded areas mark the crisis month.

Source: Based on own calculations.




Figure 3: Prognostic Quality of the Model (in sample)

Note: A Type I error is committed if there was a crisis conditional on no of tranquil periods correctly called). By the same token a Type II error is committed if there was not a crisis conditional on an alarm occurring, i.e. $\Pr[no\ crisis\ |\ alarm]$. This is equal to(1 - percent of crisis periods correctly called). alarm occurring, i.e. $\Pr[crisis \mid no\ alarm]$. This is equal to (1 - percent

0


2

0.3

Cutoff Probability

Source: Own calulations.

Figure 4: Choosing the Optimal Cutoff Probability



Note: The optimal threshold is calculated for $c_1=1,\,\gamma_1=2,\,$ and $\gamma_2>2.$ γ_2 measures the cost of the worst case scenario relative to cost of taking precautionary measures.

Source: Own calulations.

The Policy Maker's Loss function

The Loss function of the policy maker is defined as

$$L = (1 - \omega)T_2(\tau) + \gamma_1\omega(1 - T_1(\tau)) + \gamma_2\omega T_1(\tau), \tag{16}$$

 T_1 and T_2 are the Type I and Type II error, respectively. The probability of both types of errors depend on the threshold τ . where ω is the unconditional probability of a crisis and γ_1 and γ_2 are weights with $\gamma_1 > \gamma_2$.

To show that

$$\frac{d\tau}{d\omega}\Big|_{dL=0} = -\frac{\partial L/\partial\omega}{\partial L/\partial\tau} < 0 \tag{17}$$

both partial derivatives must have equal signs.

$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial \omega} = \gamma_1 (1 - T_1) - T_2 + \gamma_2 T_1, \tag{18}$$

the right of the intersection of the functions $T_1(\tau)$ and $T_2(\tau)$. where the first term is positive while the sum of the last two terms is at least positive to

$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial \tau} = T_2'(1 - \omega) - \omega T_1'(\gamma_1 - \gamma_2) \tag{19}$$

 $T_1'>0$ and $\gamma_2>\gamma_1$. For $\partial L/\partial \tau>0$ it is necessary that The first term is negative because $T_2' < 0$ and the second term is also negative because

$$T_2'(1-\omega) < \omega T_1'(\gamma_1 - \gamma_2). \tag{20}$$

Assuming that $-T_2'=T_1'$ the following must hold

$$-\frac{1-\omega}{\omega} < \gamma_1 - \gamma_2,\tag{21}$$

can be γ_2 for the condition to hold. which is only the case if γ_2 is not too large. Or more specifically, the smaller ω the larger

Analogously, it is easy to show that

$$\frac{d\tau}{d\gamma_2}\bigg|_{dL=0} = -\frac{\partial L/\partial\gamma_2}{\partial L/\partial\tau} < 0. \tag{22}$$

Since

$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial \gamma_2} = \tau \omega T_1 > 0, \tag{23}$$

 $\partial L/\partial \tau$ must be positive which was demonstrated above.