Social and Technological Efficiency of Patent Systems

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L’efficacité social et technologique des systèmes de brevet

Résumé
Cet article développe un modèle évolutionniste de dynamique industrielle dans le but de mener une analyse théorique plus riche des conséquences d’un système de brevet plus restrictif. Les premiers résultats que nous obtenons dans cet article tendent à conforter les arguments contre le système de brevet : un bien-être social plus élevé et un progrès technique plus forts sont observés dans les industries avec un système de brevet plus doux (avec une hauteur de brevet plus faible et une durée légale de brevet plus courte).

Mots-clé : Innovation, Progrès technique, Système de brevet, Droits de propriété intellectuelle, Politique technologique

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Keywords : Innovation, technical progress, patent system, Intellectual property rights, technology policy

JEL : O3, O34, L52
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1 Introduction

The demand for a stronger patenting system has become in the recent period a major source of tension between the U.S. government and the E.U. (see the recent debate on the software patents). The US demand is generally motivated by the conventional economic wisdom affirming that a strong patenting system yields convenient incentives for the private investment in Research and Development (R&D) and hence, for technical progress in Society. This rather mechanistic approach of technological dynamics and of the role of the patenting is mainly based on the neoclassical theory of technical progress that strongly focuses on the agents’ incentives rather than on the dynamics of the existent technological systems.

1.1 What is a patent?

The US Patent and Trademarks Office (USPTO) gives the following definition on its web site:

A patent for an invention is the grant of a property right to the inventor, issued by the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Generally, the term of a new patent is 20 years from the date on which the application for the patent was filed in the United States or, in special cases, from the date an earlier related application was filed, subject to the payment of maintenance fees. (…) The right conferred by the patent grant is, in the language of the statute and of the grant itself, “the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling” the invention in the United States or “importing” the invention into the United States. (…) Once a patent is issued, the patentee must enforce the patent without aid of the USPTO. [US Patent and Trademarks Office legal web site¹]

This definition puts a particular stress on the role of a patent as a certificate of a private ownership of an invention. This ownership gives to the inventor the right to exclude anyone from the provision of this invention in the US. From the point of view of the inventor, the benefits of this exclusivity (the monopoly rent) should be opposed to the costs of filing and maintaining a patent. These dimensions of the patent system directly follow from the theoretical arguments that have been used to defend the establishment of patent systems during the 19th century patent controversy.

1.2 Arguments for a patent system?

Following the arguments that have been developed by the defendants of a patent system during the patent controversy of the 19th century, a patent is

- the natural property right in ideas;
- the just reward for the inventor;
- the best incentive to invent;
- the best incentive to disclose secret information.

These arguments are based on the assumption that the main motivation of an intentional innovation is the monopoly rent that can be obtained using a superior technology or product.

Modern theoretical arguments emphasize the particularities of new technical knowledge for justifying the necessity of protecting the intellectual property rights. Following these arguments,

- the knowledge has two important characteristics: nonrivalry and nonexcludability;
- the technical knowledge is a source of externalities in R&D.

¹http://www.uspto.gov/
These two dimensions can imply an underprovision of this *public good*. As a consequence, the correct incentives must be established through a temporary monopoly position and the public disclosure of private information. These arguments have regularly been questioned by the opponents of a strong patent system. This is quite natural given that patent systems concern the reallocating rents in Society and possess, as such, a political dimension.

1.3 Some stylized facts about patenting

Following van Dijk (1994), Cohen, Nelson & Walsh (2000), Gallini & Scotchmer (2002), Hall (2002) and Mansfield (1986), we can specify some stylized facts about patenting:

- Most patentable innovations are patented (the exact proportion is industry-specific);
- Inventing around a patent occurs (with an average cost advantage of 35%);
- Most innovations combine elements from existing products;
- The effective lifetime of a patent is generally shorter than the legal lifetime (less than 8 years for the 50% of the patents in UK and France);
- Patents are useful to impede imitation: the supplementary imitation cost due to the existence of a patent is industry-specific and weights from 7% to 30%);
- The propensity of patenting has heavily increased in the last decade. This propensity is industry-specific and it is higher for larger firms.

There are more than four million patents in force in the world today, and every year applications are filed for a further 700 000 inventions. In 2002, the European Patent Office (EPO) received over 160 000 patent applications. The Figure 1 clearly shows the *explosion* of the number of patent applications and of effectively granted patents in Europe.

![Figure 1: Applications to the European Patent Office (EPO)](image-url)
1.4 Behind the incentives

Is patenting the only tool for protecting an innovation? The results of the 1994 Carnegie Mellon Survey of the U.S. manufacturing sector are summarized in Cohen, Nelson & Walsh (2000). Following these results, firms declare that they have at their disposal a variety of tools, and they do not necessarily prefer patents to other means for protecting their innovations. In fact, Firms’ declarations imply the following ordering of these mechanisms with decreasing protective effectiveness:

1. Secrecy;
2. Lead time;
3. Complementary sales/services;
4. Complementary manufacturing;
5. Patenting

The secrecy is considered by the firms as the most effective mechanism for protecting process innovations while the lead time is considered to be slightly more effective for product innovations. This survey clearly shows that the main motivation for patenting does not correspond to the theoretical argument used in the defence of a stronger patenting policy (better incentives for R&D).

This observation, combined with the recent surge in patenting gives rise to what is called today the patent paradox (low effectiveness but high patenting, see Hall & Ziedonis (2001) for electronics firms).

Patenting is mainly used by firms for strategic reasons: constructing patent fences around discrete inventions; building a negotiation power through a patent portfolio in complex industries, especially for cross-licensing issues, etc. This strategic use of the patent system must be taken into account in the evaluation of its social costs and benefits. Patent systems are promoted on the basis that they are the least expensive means to provide incentives for innovation. Anti-patent movement argues that patents are inefficient and expensive: the costs of bureaucracy (strongly increased during the recent patent surge – see Figure 1), court personnel and lawyers make the patent system very costly and unattractive. These costs add to the welfare lost due to monopoly granted by the patent system. Even worst, building patent fences around discrete innovations can constitute patent thickets implying strong dynamical inefficiencies in the innovation systems.

The social cost of defensive patenting (Cohen, Nelson & Walsh (2000)) follows from the fact that, in these cases, patenting does not foster inventions. Merges & Nelson (1990) and Mazzoleni & Nelson (1998) emphasize the complex nature of the dynamics of technology in many industries. Merges & Nelson (1990) show that a stronger patent system can have very different effects on different industries. They distinguish four classes of technologies in which the role of patents can be strongly contrasted: discrete inventions (new pharmaceuticals), cumulative technologies (aircraft), chemical technologies and science-based technologies (biotechnology).

A “one size fits all” system of intellectual property rights seems quite illusionary and can sometime imply strong social dynamic costs by blocking the development of complementary innovations or of better substitutes. The diversity-reduction effect of broad patents on prospect opening inventions can imply high social costs. As a consequence, models of innovation and of patenting must take into account the complexity of different technological regimes while evaluating the global impact of a stronger patent system and of its dimensions (mainly scope and length). An agent based approach of the industrial system, composed of boundedly rational firms, can help us to locate main issues in this debate. Moreover, at the more specific level of the patent race models, the main results are generally too strongly sensitive to the rational expectations (or perfect foresight) assumption and to the assumed homogeneity of the firms (see Silverberg & Yildizoglu (2002) for a discussion.
of this problem in the context of the Aghion & Howitt (1992) model). The main results of this literature should be tested against more realistic assumptions before using them in the analysis of the intellectual property regimes. This article develops an evolutionary model of industry dynamics, aiming to enhance our theoretical understanding of the consequences of a stronger patent system. The next section will quickly present the main characteristics of our model. The third section will be dedicated to the presentation of our simulation protocol and of the first results of the basic model. Last section will conclude the article.

2 The Model

This model concerns an industry producing a homogenous good and facing a decreasing market demand. The only production factor is the physical capital and the technology has constant returns to scale (it is linear). In each period, each firm shares its gross profits between different investment outlets: R&D, physical capital, patent budget, saving (equity) and distribution of dividends. The R&D investment of the firm is necessary for the imitative and innovative activity of the firm, and these are the only source of productivity gains in the model. Technical progress is disembodied and it corresponds to the increase of the productivity of the firm’s capital stock.

The industry is initially populated using firms with random characteristics (drawn following a normal distribution centered around common averages). Given their characteristics, firms produce following their production function. The short-period market equilibrium fixes the price at which the consumers accept to buy this production given their demand in each period. Market price determines the firm’s gross profits and these profits are used for investing on different assets (strategies): innovation and imitation follows from the R&D investment; physical capital increases as a consequence of the investment; patent budget is used to finance new patents of the renewal of the patent portfolio of the firm; dividends are distributes to the consumers and they can increase their demand; the equity is used as saving and can provide supplementary revenues for investing in future periods (see Figure 2). We dedicate in this model a particular attention to the patenting strategies of the firms.

![Figure 2: The main connections in the model](image)

In the rest of this section we will briefly present main components of the model.
2.1 Strategies and learning processes of firms

At the beginning of each period, the firm must decide how to spend the gross profits and the savings from the previous periods. In our model, these revenues can be allocated between five alternative assets (see the Figure 2):

**Investment in physical capital:** The firms expands its capital stock in order to increase its market share. \( IKRATE \) is the initial average value of this investment rate around which the strategies of the firms are created.

**R&D investment:** R&D allows the firm to create new technologies, or to imitate technology of a successful competitor. The obsolescence cost on the R&D stock, for a given firm, depends on its relative productivity, compared to the maximum level of productivity in the industry. Hence, if a firm’s productivity is low compared to the maximum level of productivity in the industry, it’s R&D stock will be subject to a high degree of obsolescence. As a consequence, the firm with the highest productivity in the industry faces no obsolescence cost. Thus, even without any new specific investment, a leading firm will be able to keep constant its R&D stock. \( IRDRATE \) is the initial average value of this investment rate around which the strategies of the firms are created.

**Patent budget:** In order to prevent other firms from benefiting from its own technological investments, a company can decide to protect an innovation. We assume that a technology may only be patented if it is sufficiently distinct from an already patented technology. The patent office can be more or less indulgent and this dimension of the patent system is measured in our model by the variable \( PATENTHEIGHT \). A patented technology can be protected for a maximum of \( PATENTLIFE \) periods. A new patent costs \( NEWPATENTCOST \) and renewing a patent for a period necessitates the payment of \( RENEWPATENTCOST \). \( PATENTRATE \) is the initial average value of this investment rate around which the strategies of the firms are created.

**Dividends:** Companies can redistribute a part of their profits to shareholders and thus to households. In this simplified model, this is the only way by which the total demand increases. The coefficient that transforms the distributed dividends into demand increases is \( \gamma \). \( DIVIDENDRATE \) is the initial average value of this investment rate around which the strategies of the firms are created.

**Savings:** Companies can save, either voluntarily and/or involuntary, part of their profits. Involuntary savings arise when one of the budgets lines is not spent in its totality. This saving is precautionary since it enables a company to offset certain consequences of unforeseen events (e.g. negative profits). In our model if a company experiences negative profits and does not have any more saving, it quits the industry. \( EQUITYRATE \) is the initial average value of this investment rate around which the strategies of the firms are created.

In each period, the learning of the firms is represented through a evolutionary algorithm: firms learn through imitation of the strategies of the others and through random experimenting (mutations). In our model, imitation is based on the market size of the opponents, rather than on their profits (like in Silverberg & Verspagen (1994)). As a consequence, a bigger competitor will have a higher probability of being imitated. These two mechanisms are respectively commanded by the probabilities \( PROBMIMITATE \) and \( PROBMUTATE \).

2.2 Technical progress and patenting

Technical progress is a result of innovation or imitation processes of firms. The success of these processes is an increasing function of the R&D investment of the firms. Firms may file patents in order to protect their technologies from imitation by competitors.
Productivity gains: innovation and imitation

In our model, innovation is a two-stage stochastic process. A first draw determines if the firm has been successful to innovate. The probability of this success is increasing with the R&D investment. A second draw then gives the effective new productivity that results from the innovation.

It should be noted that a new technology may only be used and patented if it is not covered by an existing patent.

A firm can also benefit from imitating a successful competitor’s technology. Imitation is rather rare and the probability of its success is again increasing with the R&D investment of the firm. Only unpatented technologies can be imitated. When the imitation happens, each competitor has a probability of being imitated that increases with its market share.

Patenting

The management of the patent portfolio is very crucial in our model. In this version we do not allow any sleeping patents. Hence, when a new technology is found, the inventor can choose to protect it by filing a patent. If the firm does not protect it, this technology may be imitated or invented around by the competitors. A firm will only desire to patent a technology if a) the technology is seen as sufficiently interesting to patent, and b) the firms disposes of a sufficient budget. More specifically, the probability of adopting (or keeping) a particular patent is given by a normal distribution that depends on the relative efficiency of the technology. Efficiency of a given technology is measured by the number of firms with a productivity lower than the productivity of this technology: the higher this number of such firms, the more efficient the patenting. We assume that firms cannot perfectly observe the efficiency of their innovation and they are prone to errors.

Management of the patent budget

In the beginning of each period, the firm will try to reserve a budget for patenting. This budget should cover two kind of expenses: a) the cost of maintaining previously filed patents, b) the possible cost of filing a patent for a new innovation. This budget will result from the investment strategy of the firm on patenting.

2.3 Entry and exit

In this model, the size of the industry, in terms of active firms, is allowed to change at each period. Nevertheless, an upper bound is fixed, which is the initial size $N$.

Even with negative profits, a firm may stay in the industry as long as it holds some positive savings that offset this loss. When this is no longer the case, the firm exists the industry (the case of bankruptcy). If the number of active firms is lower than $N$ at the beginning of a period, some new firms may enter into the industry. For example persistent high profits or increases of the level of profits in an industry may be an attractive signal for new entry. When entry happens, the characteristics of the new firms are drawn from values around the industry-averages. If a potential new entrant is not profitable at the current market price, and/or if the technology found by it is patented, the potential firm will not be able to enter. The probability of entry is $ENTRYPROB$. The entry is also limited, in our model, by the inverse Herfindhal concentration index.

2.4 The pseudo-code of the model

We start with a population of $N$ firms in the industry. We assume that each firm is initialized with random strategies that are drawn from the same normal distributions.

The algorithm of the model runs the following steps in each period $t$:

1. Populating the industry:
   - if $t = 1$: creation of an industry composed of $N$ firms
• if $t > 1$: death and birth process

2. For each period $t$, until $t = T$ :
   
   (a) Computation of the production levels: $Q_i^t$ and the total supply $Q_t$
   
   (b) if $t > 1$ evolution of the demand $D_t$ (depends on past dividend strategies)
   
   (c) Computation of the intra-period price (as a function of the inverse demand function): $p_t$
   
   (d) Randomize the order of play of firms in the current period $t$
   
   (e) Computation of the gross profits
   
   (f) Definition of the different budget levels for R&D, investment, patent budget, savings and dividends
   
   (g) Computation of the list of all patented productivities in the industry
   
   (h) Imitation of technologies
   
   (i) Innovation of firms
   
   (j) Management of the patent portfolio and patenting
   
   (k) Diffusion of the best strategies in the industry (depends on the market shares of the firms)
   
   (l) Mutation of strategies: possible change of the individual set of strategy rates

3 Simulation protocol and first results

3.1 Simulation protocol

Given the complexity of the interactions we model, we adopt a methodology that allows quite a systematic exploration of the parameter space of the model. This methodology is close to the Monte-Carlo method. We run 1000 series of 500 periods\(^2\) each where the results from each period has a probability of 2% of being saved. So, for each run we obtain an average number of 10 randomly chosen observations for all the measured variables. The simulations are initialized with a randomly drawn vector of values for the main parameters of the model. As a result, we obtain a set of 10,000 observations covering quite a diversified subset of the parameter space. The values from which different parameters are drawn can be read in the Appendix A. We do not necessarily discuss in the text all the parameters that appear in this appendix but only the most significant ones. We analyze the observations sampled from the last half of each run, for dates higher than the second quantile of the saved periods ($t \geq Q_2^T = 254$). We use for this analysis box plots (giving the four quartiles of the distributions of the variables), Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests between subsets, and regression trees. The statistical analysis is conducted using R (see Team (2003)).

3.2 First results on patents and social welfare

The Table 1 gives the significative influence of the dimensions of the patent system on some of our aggregate indicators (market price, productivities, number of firms...). We only present here the influences that are statistically significative at a unilateral level higher than 5% in linear regressions computed between each of the dependent variables and the indicated four dimensions of the patent system.

Table 1 indicates that a stronger patent system (with a longer PATENTLIFE, and a more indulgent patent office corresponding to a stronger PATENTHEIGHT) would imply higher concentration, market prices and profits. These benefits for the firms in the economy would also have a social cost

\(^2\)Running 1000 simulations is sufficiently robust and secure in our case since $\sigma^2/\bar{x}$ becomes stable after 500 runs for any variable $x$ in our model.
in terms of technical progress since the average and maximal productivity would be lower under such a system. This phenomenon would also be concomitant with longer effective patent lives and fewer innovations. The influence of the cost dimensions is rather obvious and marginal.

Would these influences necessarily yield a lower social welfare? Answering this question using only the market price is not very straightforward in our model since, when distributed as dividends, the profits increase the revenues of the consumers and yield a higher consumers’ surplus. As a consequence, a higher price does not automatically imply in our model a lower consumer’ surplus. This is even more likely given the increasing relationship between the PATENTLIFE and the average dividend rate of the firms (see the last line of Table 1). So, we must take a better look at the social welfare for judging its evolution under a stronger patent system.

![Figure 3: Patent strength and social welfare](image-url)
The Figure 3 gives the distribution of the social welfare (consumers’ surplus and total social surplus\(^3\)) for different patent systems: for each of the dimensions (PATENTLIFE and PATENTHEIGHT) we call ”low” the value of this dimension if it is lower than the second quantile of this variable and we call it ”high” otherwise. The configuration \(hl\) corresponds, for example, to a situation where the PATENTLIFE is high and the PATENTHEIGHT is low. As it is is shown by the boxplot\(^4\), the highest social surplus is observed when both dimensions are lower and, hence, the patent system is milder. Non-parametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests\(^5\) confirm this graphical result. As a consequence, the positive impact of a stronger patent system on the profits of the firms does not finally overweight the negative impact on consumers’ welfare. This result casts a shadow on the admitted social efficiency of strong intellectual property rights. Moreover, the similarity between the configurations \(hh\) and \(lh\) on the one hand and between \(hl\) and \(ll\) on the other indicates that the PATENTHEIGHT dominates the impact of the patent system on social surplus. This point calls for a more detailed analysis of the determinants of social welfare in our model.

We analyze the role of different parameters of the model using regression trees (Venables and Ripley [1999], chapter 10). A regression tree establishes a hierarchy between independent variables using their contributions to the overall fit \(R^2\) of the regression. More exactly, it splits the set of observations in sub-classes characterized by their value in terms of their contribution to the overall fit and of their predictions for the dependent variables (all parameters that are modified by the Monte Carlo procedure are included as explanatory variables in each of the following regressions). This value is validated against a fraction (10\%) of the sample that is not used during the estimation. Regression trees are very flexible and powerful in the clarification of the structure of the observations. The tree gives a hierarchical sequence of conditions on the variables of the model: the higher the role of a condition in the classification of the observed cases, the higher its status on the tree. For each condition, the left branch gives the cases for which the condition is true and the right branch

\(^3\)Social surplus=Consumers’ surplus+Total profits of the firms.

\(^4\)These boxplots show four quartiles of the distributions of our indicators: the statistically significant minimum and the maximum correspond to the extreme end of the whiskers, while \(Q_1\) and \(Q_3\) correspond to the edges of the central box and the median corresponds to the horizontal line inside the box.

\(^5\)The statistical appendix can be obtained from the following address: http://beagle.u-bordeaux4.fr/yildi/files/tvmy1appendix.pdf.
gives the cases that are compatible with the complementary condition. We give now a step-by-step interpretation of the main elements of the regression tree exposed in Figure 4.

The Figure 4 shows that the main determinant of the social welfare in this model is the demand effect of the distributed dividends. \( \gamma \) is the coefficient through which dividends are transformed into supplementary demand by the consumers. The top first branching of the Figure 4 shows that the social surplus is the lowest one \( \log(SS) = 10.47 \Rightarrow SS = 35242.22 \) when this coefficient is very small (the left branch: \( \gamma < 0.008993 \)). 2703 observations in our model correspond to this case. When \( \gamma \) is higher, the second component of this demand effect enters onto the scene: the initial average dividend rate \( DIVIDENDRATE \) around which the firms are initialized during the creation of the industry. The highest social welfare is obtained in the model when this value is very high \( DIVIDENDRATE \geq 0.8674 \) - the highest result corresponding to \( \log(SS) = 19.06 \) can only be obtained in the right branch of this test). If the dividend rate is more reasonable \( DIVIDENDRATE < 0.8674 \) - the right branch), \( \gamma \) distinguishes again two sets of cases: on the left, we have the cases where \( \gamma < 0.01686 \) and, on the right the ones with \( \gamma \geq 0.01686 \). The first set of cases confirms again the preponderant role played by the demand effect in our model. We should also note an interesting result that concerns the role played by the cost of new patents: the highest welfare in this case is obtained when firms distribute large dividends and when the \( NEWPATENTCOST \) is higher (so that they issue fewer patents given the lower resources dedicated to patenting and the higher cost of each patent). The second set of cases (corresponding to \( \gamma \geq 0.01686 \) and \( DIVIDENDRATE < 0.8674 \)) is more interesting. In this case, the highest social welfare \( \log(SS) = 17.31 \Rightarrow SS = 32 933 469 \) is observed when i) initially firms do enough invest in physical capital \( IKRATE \geq 0.21 \), ii) the height of the granted patents is not too high or too low \( PATENTHEIGHT \in [1.138 , 2.124] \) and iii) the depreciation of the technological knowledge is not too strong \( \alpha < 0.1207 \). When \( PATENTHEIGHT < 1.318 \), the highest welfare is obtained when the official patent life is nil and thus patents do not play any positive role on the profits of the firms \( PATENTLIFE < 0.5 \Rightarrow PATENTLIFE = 0 \). These results show that under each set of conditions concerning other variables, the welfare is higher when the patent system is milder.

What about the technological effects of the characteristics of the patent system?

The Figure 5 first shows that the technical progress is the lowest when the \( PATENTHEIGHT \) is very high \(( > 2.734 \)), and hence the patent office is very indulgent. The predominant role played by this dimension of the patent system confirms the result of Figure 3. For lower heights, the role

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Figure 5: Determinants of average productivity

Determinants of averProd, t>T/2

- PATENTHEIGHT = 0.734
- PROBIMITATE = 0.0042652
- PROBMUTATE = 0.0002852
- ENTRYPROB = 0.027262
- PATENTHEIGHT = 0.5
- PROBIMITATE = 0.0036852
- PROBMUTATE = 0.0002852
- ENTRYPROB = 0.007262
- PATENTHEIGHT = 1.5
- PROBIMITATE = 0.1568
- PROBMUTATE = 0.001568
- ENTRYPROB = 0.0002852
- PATENTHEIGHT = 2.734
- PROBIMITATE = 0.49
- PROBMUTATE = 0.1568
- ENTRYPROB = 0.0002852

n=730
n=47
n=40
n=10
n=2672
n=2197
n=48
n=8

n=2024
n=8

Determinants of averProd, t>T/2

- EntryProb = 0.007262
- ProbIMITATE = 0.0042652
- ProbMUTATE = 0.0002852
- PatentHeight = 0.734
- PatentHeight = 0.5
- PatentHeight = 1.5
- PatentHeight = 2.734

n=2672
n=2197
n=48
n=730
n=47
n=10
n=40
n=8
played by the \textit{PATENTLIFE} variable is more ambiguous: its value ($PATENTLIFE \geq 1.5$) does not really have a consequence on the technical progress itself but on the nature of the model, since two different dimensions of learning play an important and distinct role in each of these two sets of cases. When the patent life is very low, random exploration of strategies represented by the mutation operator must remain very weak ($\text{PROBMUMATE} < 0.0285\%$) in order for the industry to attain the highest productivities. When the allowed maximal life of the patents is longer, some significant entry ($\text{ENTRYPROB} > 0.726\%$) and learning through imitation ($\text{PROBIMITATE} \geq 0.45\%$) are necessary for transforming lower investments rates on physical capital ($\text{IKRATE} < 0.1568$) to the highest productivities for the industry. When the patent life allows a significant role for the patents, the learning of strategies, and the budget constraint that binds together all strategies, become crucial for technical progress. Moreover, we can check that these results are conformant with the main result of the Figure 3. That is, the highest average productivity (2877) is compatible with the configuration (hl) (high patentlife and low patentheight). The Figure 3 shows that this configuration provides a higher consumer’s surplus than the configuration (ll): the higher the average productivity, the lower the price, and, the higher the consumer’s surplus.

The Figure 5 also demonstrates the role of learning and diversity in technical progress: in both cases (with low or high patentlife), a lower $\text{ENTRYPROB}$ decreases the average productivity. This result is quite normal, since a lower value of this variable implies a lower degree of diversity of the strategies and the technologies of the firms and, hence, a possibly higher degree of market concentration. The latter can of course lead to fewer innovations and, consequently, to a lower average productivity in the industry.

4 Conclusion

"If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge of its economic consequences, to recommend instituting one. But since we have had a patent system for a long time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge, to recommend abolishing it." (Machlup (1958) – Cited by Hall (2002)).

This article develops an evolutionary model of industry dynamics in order to carry out a richer theoretical analysis of the consequences of a stronger patent system. Even if we agree with Machlup that the question of abandoning the existing patent system cannot be easily posed, the necessity for a stronger patent system, as it is defended by the North-American authorities must be questioned. The first results obtained in our article are rather consistent with the anti-patent arguments and they do not favour the case for a stronger patent system: higher social welfare and technical progress are observed in our model in industries with milder patent systems (lower patent height and patent life).

We must now refine this analysis in two directions. First, we must carry out a more detailed analysis of individual results in order to better understand the mechanisms that are behind our results. Second, we must develop a richer technology space in order to include in the analysis different technological regimes stressed by Merges & Nelson (1990). Only, with such an approach we can have a more subtile and more realistic apprehension of the consequences of a stronger patent system.
References


A Initialisation of the main parameters of the model

Exogenous variables

\( N = 50 \) : Number of firms
\( T = 500 \) : Number of periods

\( PROBIMITATE \in [0, 0.005] \) : Probability of imitation
\( PROBMUTATE \in [0, 0.005] \) : Probability of mutation

\( SIGMAIN \in [0.1, 1.5] \) : Standard deviation of the innovative draws

\( DIVIDENDRATE \in [0, 1] \) : Initial average share of the distributed dividends in the gross profits

\( PATENTRATE \in [0, 1] \) : Initial average share of the patent budget in the gross profits

\( EQUITYRATE \in [0, 1] \) : Initial average share of the savings in the gross profits

\( IKRATE \in [0, 1] \) : Initial average share of the investment in physical capital in the gross profits

\( IRDRATE \in [0, 1] \) : Initial average share of the R&D budget in the gross profits

\( ENTRYPROB \in [0, 0.01] \) : Probability of new entry

\( ALPH A \in [0, 1] \) : Depreciation rate of the technological knowledge of the firm

\( GAMMA \in [0, 0.02] \) : Transformation rate of dividends into supplementary demand

\( NEWPATENTCOST \in [0, 5] \) : Cost of filing a new patent

\( RENEWPATENTCOST \in [0, 1] \) : Cost of renewing an existing patent

\( PATENTHEIGHT \in [0, 5] \) : The height of the granted patents. If the patent correspond to the productivity \( A_0 \), all productivities in \([A_0 - PATENTHEIGHT, A_0 + PATENTHEIGHT]\) are protected from the competitors.

\( PATENTLIFE \in [0, 30] \) : Legal maximal life of patents

\( EQUITY \in [10, 50] \) : Initial equity of the firms

\( CF \in [0, 2] \) : Fixed costs of the firms

\( K \in [10, 50] \) : Initial average capital stock of the firms

\( PROD \in [0.2, 1.2] \) : Initial average productivity of the firms

\( COST \in [0, 1] \) : Initial average unit using cost of the capital

\( DEM \in [300, 1000] \) : Initial demand coefficient

\( ETA \in 0.9 \) : Elasticity of demand

Endogenous variables

\( price \) : Market price

\( \text{max prod} \) : Maximal productivity of the period

\( \text{averprod} \) : Average productivity of the period

\( activeN \) : Number of active firms in the industry

\( invCI \) : Inverse Herfindal index of the period

\( averprofit \) : Average profits

\( nbinnov \) : Number of innovations in the period

\( nbpat \) : Total number of active patents in the period

\( cumbpat \) : Cumulated number of the patents in the industry history

\( \text{max patage} \) : Age of the oldest active patent

\( nbpatfirms \) : Number of patenting firms in the period

\( avpatrate \) : Average percentage of the patent budget in the gross profits

\( avirdrate \) : Average percentage of the R&D budget in the gross profits

\( avikrate \) : Average percentage of the capital investment budget in the gross profits

\( avequitrate \) : Average percentage of the savings in the gross profits

\( avdivrate \) : Average percentage of the distributed dividends in the gross profits
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