Oil Crisis, Energy-Saving Technological Change and the Stock Market Crash of 1973-74

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Abstract

The market value of U.S. corporations was nearly halved following the oil crisis of October 1973. Real energy prices more than doubled by the end of the decade, increasing energy costs and spurring innovation in energy-saving technologies by corporations. This paper uses a neo-classical growth model to quantify the impact of the increase in energy prices on the market value of U.S. corporations. In the model, corporations adopt energy-saving technologies as a response to the energy price shock and the price of installed capital falls due to investment irreversibility. The model calibrated to match the subsequent decline in energy consumption in the U.S. generates a 24% decline in market valuation; accounting for nearly half of what is observed in the data.

1 Introduction

The market value of U.S. corporations, relative to the replacement cost of their tangible assets, was nearly halved during 1973-74 (See Figure 1 and the data appendix for the sources and computations underlying this and all of our figures). This ratio, also known as the Tobin’s (average) \( q \), averaged 1.06 over the 1962-72 period, fell sharply during 1973-74, and stagnated for the following decade. Over 1974-1984, Tobin’s \( q \) for U.S. corporations averaged only 0.55, 48% less relative to the decade prior to 1973. Tobin’s \( q \) did not recover until the late 90’s.

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This abrupt decline in corporate market valuations coincides exactly with the oil crisis initiated by the OPEC embargo announced in early October of 1973. The largest drop in market values occurred in the 4th quarter of 1973 and throughout 1974 (See Figure 2).

The oil crisis translated into a 34% percent increase in real energy prices over 1973-74. Energy prices continued to rise for the rest of the decade, especially during 1979-81 due to the events in Iran (See Figure 3). By 1981, real energy prices were 2.1 times higher than what they were in 1972. Energy prices declined after 1982; however, they had yet to come back to their pre-1973 levels after 20 years.
The links between the increase in energy prices and the fall in the market value of non-energy producing corporations, which are the focus of our analysis, are straightforward: First, the sharp and persistent increase in energy costs squeezed both current and expected future dividends causing a fall in market value. Second, as the increase in energy costs was highly persistent, corporations started adopting and investing in new technologies that were more energy-efficient. This spur in energy-saving technologies resulted in capital obsolescence for the old energy-inefficient technologies driving their value down (cf. Baily [4]). Although these links are intuitive and the timing of the two events is suggestive, the energy explanation has had difficulties both empirically and theoretically and has led many authors to entertain other explanations for the stock market crash of 1973-74.

There are mainly two empirical criticisms regarding the energy explanation. The first is that there is not a high enough correlation between the drop in market values and the pre-1973 cost share of energy for corporations (cf. Wei [42] and Greenwood & Jovanovic [16]). We have computed the correlation between the percentage decline in market value from 1972 to 1974 and the ratio energy expenditure to value added for all manufacturing industries (non-energy producing) at the 3-digit SIC code and found that this coefficient is actually negative.1 Thus, we confirm previous results that energy-intensive industries did not suffer the largest drops in market value. The second empirical criticism is the absence of a stock market crash during the energy price shocks of 1979-1981. On the theoretical side, it has been difficult to construct models where energy prices have a quantitatively significant impact on corporate market values.

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1Market value by SIC is taken from the Standard and Poor's COMPSTAT quarterly data base. We only consider the market value of firms listed in COMPSTAT before 1972 that were also listed after 1974, which controls for the effects of entry and exit. Energy expenditure and value added by SIC is taken from the Annual Survey of Manufactures.
primarily because the share of energy in total costs of businesses is small. In particular, Wei [42] uses a putty-clay model to find that energy price increases can account for only 2% of the decline in market valuation.

The aforementioned empirical criticisms would be especially strong if rising energy costs were the only channel through which energy affected market values and Tobin’s $q$. However, this is not necessarily the case. In fact, there is no reason to expect a drop in Tobin’s $q$ due to an increase in energy prices as long as the price of installed capital does not deviate from potential replacements. The standard asset pricing model shows that as long as investment in the old technologies does not stop, Tobin’s $q$ will remain constant regardless of the cost share of energy. In this respect, the introduction of new energy-efficient technologies and the obsolescence of old technologies appears to be a better explanation for the drop in Tobin’s $q$. This transmission mechanism has the implication that Tobin’s $q$ and the drop in energy share (rather than the level of energy share) should be correlated; an implication we document to be supported by 3-digit SIC level data. Another implication of this mechanism is that further price shocks would not necessarily impact Tobin’s $q$, as long as newly introduced capital after the initial price shock does not become obsolete after further price shocks; hence the absence of a fall in market value during 1979-1981.

It is also important to see that although the putty-clay model of Wei [42] is intended to capture price-induced savings in energy costs by allowing substitution in new vintages of capital, it counterfactually predicts that real energy-output ratio should go up as energy prices start to decline in the 80’s and 90’s. As shown in Figure 4, real energy use (as a share of output) declined monotonically after 1973-74 even when energy prices were going down in the 80’s. This fact is consistent with a technology that is characterized by increasingly lower energy requirements per unit of production (i.e. energy-saving technological change) and not consistent with a putty-clay model.
The main objective of this paper is to determine how much of the decline in the market value of non-energy producing corporations can be accounted for by the observed changes in energy prices. To do so, we employ a dynamic general equilibrium model with technology-specific capital and investment irreversibility. These assumptions are standard in the literature (cf. Sargent [34], Dixit and Pyndick [11]), and allow for Tobin’s $q$ to fall below 1 as in the data. In the model economy, firms develop and adopt energy-saving technologies as a response to the energy price shock and the price of installed capital falls due to investment irreversibility. Firms do not introduce these energy-saving technologies prior to the energy shock because it is costly. The two costs involved in the process of developing and adopting a new type of capital are, first, a minimum size investment requirement similar to Boldrin & Levine [6] and, second, a learning curve associated to the use of the new technology. With low energy prices, firms forego these costs. However, with sharp increases in energy prices it pays for corporations to incur them.

The history of technical change [see Young [41] for some specific examples] and a vast literature on learning curves suggest that most new technologies are initially inferior to the older production methods they seek to replace. Incremental improvements over time, however, allow new technologies to catch up and eventually surpass older systems of production. This process, frequently captured in the literature by the term "learning-by-doing", is a key component of our energy-saving innovation analysis. The study of Bahk and Gort [5] gives empirical support to the existence of learning by doing in the context of a production function similar to the one in our model. Moreover, these authors find that learning by doing at the aggregate (industrial) level is particularly prominent when technological change is embodied in new technologies, as
is the case in our analysis. The inclusion of learning by doing in aggregate quantitative studies like ours is common place in the literature. Recent contributions include Klenow [25] in the area of productivity analysis, Young [41] and Parente [29] in development, and Chang, et. al. [9] in business cycles.

We calibrate the parameters of the model to match certain features of the U.S. economy; in particular we set the energy-efficiency of the new technologies to match the decline in real energy-output ratios. Given this feature, our model suggests energy prices can account for almost half of the drop in Tobin’s $q$, and partially for its stagnation throughout the 70’s and 80’s.

Our paper focuses on the 1974-1994 period which Hall [18] refers to as the “single hardest [equity market] episode to understand”; a period where the market value of U.S. corporations was much lower than the replacement cost of their tangible assets. We do not try to account for the boom and subsequent collapse in equity prices during 1994-2004.

Other explanations put forward for the stock market crash of 1973-74 are the IT revolution (cf. Greenwood & Jovanovic [16], and Laitner and Stolyarov [26]) and investment subsidies provided by the government to businesses in this period (cf. McGrattan & Prescott [27]). The IT explanation is similar to ours in spirit, whereby the innovation of information technologies drive down the price of installed capital. Peralta-Alva [30] uses a neoclassical growth model with capital accumulation to test this idea and finds that the quality of new technologies that will generate the observed drop in Tobin’s $q$ would also generate a two-fold increase in investment, sharply in contrast with the data. McGrattan & Prescott [27] argue that the investment subsidies drive a wedge between the price of installed capital and replacement capital and can account for one third of the decline in market valuations observed in the 70’s. Our model is not inconsistent with this explanation, since investment subsidies were raised partly to encourage firms to adopt energy-efficient technologies. We, nevertheless, abstract from subsidies in our model, and study the effects of the oil crisis and energy-saving technological change in isolation from the government response.

The rest of our paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides empirical support to the price induced innovation hypothesis. Section 3 lays out the model. Calibration of model parameters are given in Section 4 and findings are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.

2 Energy-Saving Technological change after 1974

Our model connects the decline in the energy requirements per unit of output observed in the U.S. aggregate data to the endogenous introduction of energy saving technologies. A fundamental assumption in our analysis is that capital embodies a particular technology. Such an assumption is familiar from Solow [37] and fits particularly well with inventions that transform the whole economy. Our key hypothesis is that the observed increase in energy prices provided the right
incentives for firms to develop and adopt a new type of capital. The introduction of this new type of capital, in turn, gave birth to a new aggregate production function characterized by its energy saving properties. In what follows, we elaborate on the existing empirical support for our key hypotheses and assumptions. First, we evaluate the main alternative explanation for the observed decline in the U.S. aggregate energy consumed per unit of output, which attributes this decline to changes in the sectoral composition of the U.S. GDP. We find that this alternative explanation falls short of accounting for the data. Secondly, we give some key examples of energy-saving technologies introduced during the mid-70s as a result of the energy crisis of 1973-74.

The observed decline in the energy to GDP ratio might have been caused by changes in the level and structure of sectoral activity. As it is well known, the sectoral composition of the U.S. GDP has changed quite dramatically over the last 40 years. In particular, the value added of the manufacturing sector (which is energy intensive) has declined relative to the GDP. At the same time, the value added of other economic sectors like services and finance, insurance and real state, which are less energy intensive, have increased relative to the GDP. To test whether changes in sectoral composition can account for the observed decline in the energy to GDP ratio we performed the following experiment. First, we obtain from Jorgenson’s KLEM data set the average 1960-72 real energy to value added ratio for each economic sector at the 2 digit SIC classification level. Then we compute, from the sectoral GDP-by-industry accounts of the BEA, the change in the fraction of the GDP produced by each one of these sectors. Finally, we assume that the energy to value added ratio of all sectors remained constant across time and compute the implied energy output ratio at the aggregate level. We find that sectoral activity can account for less than a fifth of the total decline of the energy output ratio (a drop of 7% in the overall energy to output ratio). This result is consistent with the findings of Schiper [35] who documents that most of the decline in energy intensity of the U.S. economy can be attributed to improved energy efficiency and not to the level and structure of sectoral activity.

Examples for the introduction of energy-saving technologies during the mid-70’s abound. One of the most important changes in the manufacturing sector during the 1975-1995 period was the increased use of Advanced Manufacturing Technologies. Examples of this include computer aided design and manufacturing, numerically-controlled machines, and information networks. These improvements constitute a form of embodied technological change. It is new capital, including both hardware and software, that incorporates the advancements in technology. Doms and Dunne [13] use establishment-level data to determine changes in energy intensity arising from differences in plant characteristics and energy prices. The first of their two main findings is that plants that utilize higher numbers of advanced technologies are less energy intensive. Their second finding is that plants constructed during the period of high energy prices, 1973-1983, are

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2 Available at http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/jorgenson/data/35klem.html
generally more energy efficient than plants built during other periods. Another development that lowered the energy intensity of all sectors was the introduction of energy-efficient buildings. U.S. residential and commercial buildings consume 40% of all U.S. energy and are therefore key to understand the trends in energy intensity. Rosenfeld [32] finds that most of the efficiency gains in the heating and cooling of buildings took place during the period of 1973-1983. During those years, technological improvements in the heating, lighting and cooling systems allowed for a decrease of 1.2 million barrels of oil per day despite the fact that 20 million new homes were built, and commercial floor space increased by 40 percent. Another sector that experienced dramatic energy-saving changes after 1973 was the plastics industry. Joyce [23] documents that the Union Carbide Unipol Process, introduced in the mid-70’s, required a much smaller plant, produced twice as much product, and lowered the energy efficiency of polyethylene production from 8400 BTUs per pound to 1500 BTUs. Many more examples of energy-saving technologies introduced during the mid 1970s can be found in Tester, Wood and Ferrari [38].

Other authors have suggested a causal link between the energy crisis and the introduction of energy saving technologies. For example, Schurr [36] finds that the energy intensity of the U.S. economy started its long-run decline by the end of World War I and stabilized (actually had a small positive growth rate) during 1950-1973. He finds that energy intensity declined at a faster speed between 1973-1983 than any other period in the 20th century. He concludes that the introduction of energy-saving technologies resulting from the oil crisis is the main culprit for this faster decline. Popp [31] uses patent data to analyze the impact of energy prices on energy-saving innovation. He finds that the number of successful patent applications of energy-saving technologies increased dramatically during the mid-70’s. The main conclusion of the author, based on econometric analysis, is that energy prices have a strong, positive impact on the number of energy-saving technologies.

3 Model economy

In this section, we present a general equilibrium asset pricing model with capital accumulation and an explicit causal link between energy prices and the introduction of energy saving technologies. This model will be calibrated to match certain features of the non-energy producing sectors of the U.S. economy and used to derive the quantitative implications of the energy crisis for asset prices and other macroeconomic aggregates.

Production is undertaken by corporations which are in turn owned by infinitely-lived households. Energy, an input in production, is imported from abroad and there is trade balance each period. There are two types of production technologies which differ in their energy requirements. Capital is technology specific and investment decisions are irreversible. Prior to 1974, agents assume that energy prices are going to stay at their pre-crisis level forever. The energy crisis takes place in the beginning of 1974 and takes the agents in the model by surprise. After 1974,
the model is deterministic and all economic agents have perfect foresight on energy prices.

**Stand-in household**

The population in period $t$ is denoted by $N_t$ and it grows with factor $\eta$, so $N_{t+1} = \eta N_t$. The stand-in household’s preferences are described by the following utility function

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t) N_t,$$

where $c$ is per-capita consumption, and $u(\cdot)$ is given by

$$u(c) = \begin{cases} 
\frac{c^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} & \text{for } \sigma \neq 1 \\
\log(c) & \text{for } \sigma = 1
\end{cases}.$$

The intertemporal elasticity of substitution is determined by $1/\sigma$. Each member of the household is endowed with a unit of time each period, which is supplied inelastically to the labor market. The household participates in a market for shares of the corporations. Owning a fraction $s_t$ of the perfectly divisible share entitles the shareholder to the same fraction of the dividends paid by the firm. The household’s problem is to choose sequences of consumption $\{c_t\}$ and shares of equity $\{s_t\}$ that maximize utility subject to the following budget constraint:

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} p_t [N_t c_t + V_t (s_{t+1} - s_t)] = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} p_t [w_t N_t + d_t s_t].$$

Here, $V$ denotes the price of an equity share, $w$ is the wage rate, and $d$ are dividends per share. The Arrow-Debreu price, denoted by $p_t$, is the date-0 value of one unit of consumption in period $t$.

**Representative firm**

The representative firm produces the only good of this economy, $y$, using a constant returns to scale technology. Production requires two technology-specific types of capital, $k_1$ and $k_2$, labor, $n_1$ and $n_2$, energy, $e_1$ and $e_2$, and is summarized by:

$$y = y_1 + y_2$$

$$y_1 = [\gamma k_1^\rho + (1 - \gamma) (\xi_1 e_1)^\rho]^{\frac{1}{\rho}} (A_1 n_1)^{1-\alpha}$$

$$y_2 = [\gamma k_2^\rho + (1 - \gamma) (\xi_2 e_2)^\rho]^{\frac{1}{\rho}} (A_2 n_2)^{1-\alpha}.$$

All other factors held equal, technology one requires more energy per unit of output than technology two and thus $\xi_1 < \xi_2$. Parameter $\rho < 0$ determines the degree of complementarity between capital and energy. The labor share of total income is given by $1 - \alpha$. The sequences of total factor productivities, $A_1$ and $A_2$ are exogenously given and deterministic. Every period $A_1$ grows by a factor of $\gamma A_1$.
The initial conditions for our analysis have $k_{1,0} > 0$ and $k_{2,0} = 0$. Thus, the energy-intensive technology 1 is active and the associated capital stock follows the law of motion

\begin{equation}
\begin{aligned}
k_{1,t+1} &= x_{1,t} + (1 - \delta)k_{1,t} \\
x_{1,t} &\geq 0, \text{ for all } t \geq 0.
\end{aligned}
\end{equation}

The firm may also choose to pay the development and adoption costs of a new, energy-saving, type of capital, $k_2$. We model the process of energy-saving innovation following Boldrin and Levine [6]. Thus, a one-shot minimum investment of $C > 0$ units of output must be spent in order to obtain the first $\psi C$ units of output must be spent in order to obtain the first $\psi C$ units of $k_2$, with $0 \leq \psi \leq 1$. $D_t$ denotes the amount of resources the firm chooses to spend on the adoption and development of the energy saving technology with $D_t \geq C$, and $\hat{t}$ denotes the period when the firm chooses to incur such costs.

After the first unit of capital of type two is introduced, the law of accumulation for its capital is standard and given by

\begin{equation}
\begin{aligned}
k_{2,t+1} &= x_{2,t} + (1 - \delta)k_{2,t} \\
x_{2,t} &\geq 0, \text{ for all } t \geq \hat{t}.
\end{aligned}
\end{equation}

The level of productivity for technology 2 is initially lower than technology one and is subject to a learning curve described by:

\begin{align*}
A_{2,t} &= (\Lambda - (1 - \Phi)\lambda^{-(t-\hat{t})})A_{1,t} \text{ for all } 0 \leq t - \hat{t} \leq 5, \\
A_{2,t} &= A_{1,t} \text{ for all } t - \hat{t} \geq 5.
\end{align*}

The firm hires labor services and imports energy from abroad. It owns the capital stock and in turn pays dividends $d$ to its shareholders, who are the residual claimants of the income of the firm. The output of the firm is subject to a time invariant tax at a rate of $\tau_y$. Dividends equal firm after-tax income less payments for wages, energy purchased at an exogenously given price $p^e$, and new investments, i.e.

\[d = (1 - \tau_y)y - D - \sum_{i=1}^{2} \{wn_i - x_i - p^e e_i\}.\]

The objective of the firm is to maximize shareholder’s value,

\[\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} p_t d_t\]

taking prices as given. All tax revenues are wasted by the government.
Competitive equilibrium

A competitive equilibrium for this economy is a sequence of prices \( \{p_t^e, p_t, V_t, w_t\} \) and allocations for consumption, asset holdings, investment, energy, labor, and development costs \( \{c_t, s_t, x_{1,t}, x_{2,t}, e_{1,t}, e_{2,t}, n_{1,t}, n_{2,t}, D_t\} \) such that

1. Given prices, \( \{c_t, s_t\} \) are a solution to the household’s problem
2. Given prices, \( \{x_{1,t}, x_{2,t}, e_{1,t}, e_{2,t}, n_{1,t}, n_{2,t}, D_t\} \) are a solution to the problem of the firm
3. Markets clear, and aggregate feasibility is satisfied at all times, namely:

\[
\begin{align*}
    s_t &= 1 \\
    n_{1,t} + n_{2,t} &= N_t \\
    c_t + x_{1,t} + x_{2,t} + p_t^e (e_{1,t} + e_{2,t}) + D_t &= (1 - \tau_y) y_t \\
\end{align*}
\]  

(3)

Remark 1 In any equilibrium, the replacement cost of a unit of existing capital is constant and equal to one unit of period t consumption good.

This follows as a consequence of the aggregate resource constraints (3), and of the laws of motion of capital. It is now possible to relate the theory to the data\(^3\) of Figure 1. Market capitalization in the model as of the end of period \( t \) equals \( V_t \), which is the numerator of Tobin’s \( q \). The model’s replacement cost of existing capital at the beginning of period \( t + 1 \) is \( k_{1,t+1} + k_{2,t+1} \), which is the denominator of \( q \), and thus

Remark 2 The model’s measure of Tobin’s average \( q \) is

\[
q_t = \frac{V_t}{k_{1,t+1} + k_{2,t+1}}.
\]

The equilibrium behavior of asset prices for this economy is characterized by the following proposition:

Proposition 3 In any equilibrium

\[V_0 = \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} p_t d_t.\]  

\(^3\)Note that the data corresponds only to the corporate sector, while the model represents the economy as a whole. One can, nevertheless, write a model with a corporate and a non-corporate sector. The results we obtained when simulating such a model were essentially the same as the ones presented here. However, the analysis was much more convoluted and harder to relate to the existing literature. For the sake of simplicity, and knowing the aforementioned inconsistency is irrelevant for the results, we use a one sector model in all of what follows.
Moreover, in any equilibrium where the two types of capital are available

\[ V_t = \left( 1 - \frac{\mu_1}{p_t} \right) k_1 + \left( 1 - \frac{\mu_2}{p_t} \right) k_2, \]

where \( \mu_1 \) and \( \mu_2 \) are the multipliers of the irreversibility constraints (1) and (2).

**Proof.** The consumer’s first order conditions with respect to \( s_{t+1} \) and \( c_t \) imply

\[ p_t V_t = p_{t+1} (d_{t+1} + V_{t+1}). \]  \hspace{1cm} (4)

Without loss of generality set \( p_0 = 1 \). The recursive application of equation 4 delivers

\[ V_0 = \lim_{T \to \infty} \left\{ \sum_{t=1}^{T} p_t d_t + p_T V_T \right\}, \]

which paired with the transversality condition \( \lim_{T \to \infty} p_T V_T = 0 \) delivers the first result. Consider now an equilibrium where capital of type two has been already introduced. First order conditions with respect to capital and investment imply

\[ p_t - \mu_{i,t} = p_{t+1} \left[ (1 - \delta) + (1 - \tau_y) \frac{\partial y_i}{\partial k_{i,t+1}} \right] - \mu_{i,t+1}(1 - \delta), \text{ for } i = 1, 2. \] \hspace{1cm} (5)

After some algebra, the homogeneity of the production function, the law of motion of capital, and the definition of dividends yield

\[ (p_t - \mu_1) k_{1,t+1} + (p_t - \mu_2) k_{2,t+1} = (p_{t+1} - \mu_{t+1}) k_{1,t+2} + \]
\[ (p_{t+1} - \mu_{2t+1}) k_{2,t+2} + p_{t+1} d_{t+1}. \] \hspace{1cm} (6)

Finally, the recursive application of equation 6 together with the firm’s transversality conditions for capital accumulation can be used to derive the second part of the proposition since

\[ V_t = \sum_{i=t}^{\infty} p_i d_i = k_{1,t+1} \left( 1 - \frac{\mu_1}{p_t} \right) + k_{2,t+1} \left( 1 - \frac{\mu_2}{p_t} \right) \]

This result illustrates the mechanism through which the market value of a firm can go below the replacement cost of its assets. In a world where investment decisions are reversible, if agents have too much capital they can then consume a portion of it and bring capital back to its optimal level. In a world where capital is irreversible, it is impossible to resort to this mechanism. When agents have a stock of capital larger than the optimal one, irreversibility binds and the price of capital falls below one. Notice that the model also delivers the standard result where the market value of the firm is equal to the expected present value of its dividend flows.
4 Calibration

To calibrate the parameters of the model, we follow Cooley and Prescott [10] and match certain aggregate features of the U.S. economy in the pre-crisis period of 1962-1972 to the balanced growth path of the model. We set $\eta$ equal to 1.01 to match the 1% average growth rate of population, and $\gamma_{A1}$, the growth factor of labor-augmenting efficiency for technology 1, equal to 1.02 to match the average per capita growth rate of U.S. corporate output which is 2%.

Estimates of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, determined by parameter $\sigma$ in our model, vary between 1 and 2. We pick $\sigma = 1.75$ and perform sensitivity analysis to different values of this parameter. The depreciation rate $\delta$ is set equal to 5.8% and the proportional tax on output, $\tau$, to 0.3 to match an investment-output ratio of 15% and a capital-output ratio of 1.7. We set the discount factor $\beta$ to 0.98 to match a steady state real interest rate of 5.15%.

The observed average labor share of income in the corporate sector is matched by the model by setting $\alpha$ equal to 0.33. $\gamma$ is calibrated to 0.77 so that the model’s initial steady-state energy-output ratio (prior to the energy shock) matches the 1962-72 U.S. average (5.5%). $\xi_1$ is set equal to 30.9 to match the pre-crisis capital-energy ratio and $\xi_2$ is set equal to 53 so as to match a new steady-state energy-output ratio of 3.3%. $\rho$ is set equal to $-20$ to match the model’s transition of energy-use to output ratio from the old to the new steady-state as close to the data as possible.4

We set the minimum investment size parameter $C$ equal to 0.19 (9% of the capital stock), which is the minimum value such that corporations do not adopt the energy-saving capital before 1974 but chose to adopt after the energy shock. The percentage of the initial minimum size which is actually operatable in production, $\psi$, is set to 94% so that the model’s equilibrium investment matches the data one year after the shock.5

The learning-by-doing parameter $\Lambda$, $\Phi$ and $\lambda$ are set to 1.392, 0.108 and 1.1787 respectively. Bahk and Gort [5] document that the higher growth in the productivity of a new technology fades away, on average, after the fifth year it was introduced. Jovanovic and Nyarko [22] document "progress ratios", i.e. ratios of peak to initial productivity, from a dozen of empirical studies of learning by doing. The range is 1.14-2.9. We pick a value of 2 for our benchmark experiments and perform several sensitivity tests to the values of this parameter. All of the aforementioned empirical studies coincide in that most of the learning takes place within the first two years that follow the introduction of any given new technology. Thus, we assume that one half of the total productivity gains associated with learning by doing are achieved by the second year of the introduction of the energy-saving capital. In summary, the parameters we pick ensure that6: i)
\[ A_{2,t} = \frac{A_{1,t}}{2} \text{ ii) } A_{2,t+2} = \frac{3}{4} A_{1,t+2} \text{ and iii) } A_{2,t+5} = A_{1,t+5}. \]

5 Quantitative Findings

In this section, we derive the quantitative implications of the oil crisis for equity prices and other macroeconomic aggregates. In all of our quantitative experiments, we assume that the U.S. economy was in a balanced growth equilibrium (i.e., a competitive equilibrium where all variables grow at a constant rate) during 1960-72. Households and firms assume that technological constraints and energy prices will remain unchanged over the infinite future. Our computational appendix describes the numerical method employed to solve for equilibrium.

To understand the role of each of the key components of the model, we proceed in a gradual fashion. First, we consider a special case of the model economy in which innovation in energy-saving technologies is not possible before 1974. On 1974, energy saving capital arrives unexpectedly, for free, and with the same level of productivity of existing methods. In a second experiment energy saving technologies arrive exogenously but they are subject to learning by doing. Finally, we consider the full-fledged version of the model with endogenous adoption and learning by doing.

5.1 Exogenous arrival of energy-saving technologies

We depart from a balanced growth equilibrium where \( C \) equals infinity and agents expect energy prices to remain at their average 1960-73 level. On 1974, we change energy price expectations to match the time series data from 1974 up to 2000. On 1974, energy-saving capital becomes available and \( C \) is set equal to zero. The results for the economy where the new technology arrives exogenously and is as productive as the old one are summarized by Figure 2 below.

\[ \text{2 and then wait for 5 years for the level of productivity to catch up. With only minimum size, but no learning-by-doing, the minimum size required for endogenous adoption is very high and therefore the aggregate series (for example investment) are unrealistic.} \]
The exogenous arrival of energy-saving technologies can account for a 20% drop in Tobin’s q. Energy-saving capital enters gradually into the economy and market values recover in a smooth fashion. The recovery takes almost 20 years, which is consistent with the U.S. data. The model has been calibrated so that its energy output ratio matches the average trends of its U.S. counterpart. In this benchmark case, the energy crisis translates into an economic recession much less pronounced than what is observed in the U.S. data. Notice, however, that we have abstracted from business cycle movements in total factor productivities. Finally, in the model economy one finds a slight drop in the investment output ratio precisely at the time that the corresponding U.S. figure started increasing. The increase in investment observed in the data is most likely due to investment subsidies (the investment tax credit) that peaked during the late 1970s. Our paper focuses on the impact of technical change on the stock market and abstracts from investment subsidies. Nevertheless, if investment subsidies were introduced the drop in market values predicted by our model would be even larger (cf. McGrattan and Prescott [27]).

Figure 3 summarizes the transition in an economy where energy-saving capital arrives exogenously and unexpectedly, but where the productivity of the new technology is subject to a learning curve compatible with existing empirical studies. The results are similar to those of
the previous benchmark experiment. However, this version of the model does a better job in predicting certain features of the data. In particular, the drop in market value is of the same magnitude as before but more persistent, and the cyclical trends of GDP match better those of the U.S. corporate gross output.

Figure 3: Unexpected arrival of energy-saving technologies with a learning curve

5.2 Price induced innovation in Energy-saving technologies

We examine here the full fledged version of our model in a situation where energy prices and energy-cost shares correspond to the 1960-73 average of the U.S. economy and are expected to continue at that level for the infinite future. Energy-saving technologies can be adopted after incurring a fixed cost and are subject to a learning curve. The model economy departs from a balanced growth path in which, given energy price expectations and adoption costs, energy saving technologies are not adopted by the representative firm. We associate this equilibrium with the average behavior of the U.S. economy during 1960-73. On 1974, energy prices rise unexpectedly and energy price expectations match the U.S. data from 1974 to 2000. Our objective is to determine the quantitative implications of the energy crisis for the market value of U.S.
corporations. The equilibrium time series from the model economy after the energy price shock hits are summarized in Figure 4.

The behavior of energy prices from 1974 to 2000 gives firms enough incentives to pay the fixed costs associated to the development and adoption of energy saving technologies. Thus, the energy crisis gives rise to the endogenous obsolescence of existing capital and its market value falls by 24%. The learning curve makes this drop in market value persistent. Tobin’s q is 20% below its 1973 level up to 1978. Energy saving technologies gradually replace the old production methods and, after the total factor productivity of the new technology catches up with the old one, market values recover in a smooth fashion. As in the exogenous case, the trends in energy output from the model are consistent with those in the U.S. data. Investment on the year of the energy crisis matches the data by construction. From 1975 to 1979, however, the model’s investment-output ratio tracks the movements in its data counterpart fairly well. As we abstract from investment subsidies, the model’s investment falls after the large energy price increases of 1979-81. As energy prices start to fall during the mid 1980s investment moves smoothly towards its new balanced growth equilibrium. The behavior of corporate output of non-energy producing firms in the model is also qualitatively consistent with the observed movements in the U.S. data.
5.3 Energy price expectations during the mid 1970s

The transmission mechanism we evaluate in this paper is as follows: higher energy prices motivate the development and adoption of new, energy-efficient, technologies. As a result, old capital becomes obsolete and its market value collapses. The development and adoption of a new aggregate production technology is costly. With the low energy prices that prevailed during 1960-72 it was not economically optimal to incur these costs. Higher energy prices may have provided the incentives to do so, but only if this increase in energy prices was perceived as persistent. In what follows we provide some evidence that suggests that was indeed the case.

The main source of our analysis is the Energy Information Administration (EIA) which, after the energy crisis, was required by Congress to report short and long-run forecasts for energy prices, energy production and consumption. To do so, the EIA developed the Project Independence Evaluation System (PIES). The PIES models energy demand and supply independently. Energy demand for the different types of energy are assumed to depend on its price, and on the price of substitutes; demand is also assumed to depend on the level of economic activity, and on the ability of consumers and capital stocks to adjust to these factors. Energy supply is estimated separately for oil, natural gas and coal. For each region and fuel, reserve estimates are combined with the technologies and costs of finding and producing these fuels to estimate the costs of increasing supply. The PIES then attempts to match these energy demands as a function of fuel, sector and price with the available supply in the regions which can supply these needs at the lowest price to find a balance of equilibrium. If supply is not available to satisfy the specific demands in an area, the prices are allowed to vary until supply and demand are brought into balance. The details about the PIES model can be found at Appendixes A-E of the 1976 National Energy Outlook.

According to the EIA, energy prices were expected to remain at their 1976 level through 1985 as the following quote illustrates7 "...there is no significant likelihood of a considerable lower price for OPEC oil in this period ... Most of the analytical emphasis is placed on a continuation of current prices (in 1975 dollars)." One year later the forecasts were even more pessimistic. The 1977 Annual Report to Congress of the EIA states: "Prices for all energy fuels are forecast to increase in real terms through 1990." The 1977 energy price forecast of the EIA is summarized in Figure 5 below:

In its 1977 volume, the EIA reports a survey of the "principal, most recent, long-term energy price projections". The purpose of the survey was to collate the prevailing long-term views projected by "prominent authorities." None of these forecasts predicted any decline in real energy prices through 1985 and all but one predicted that real energy prices in 1985-2000 would be significantly (27% on average) higher than during 1975-85.\(^8\)

Figure 6 below illustrates that energy price forecasts produced by the EIA were not able to predict the large drop in energy prices that occurred during the late 1980s even after energy prices had started declining.

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\(^8\)See Table 2.11 of the 1977 EIA Annual Report to Congress, Volume II, page 35.
In summary, energy price forecasts after the crisis of 1973-74 predicted either constant or increasing trends in the medium term, and most of them expected prices to go up in the long run. Furthermore, energy price forecasts could not foresee the huge decline that started around 1982 even when the decline had started. Hence, there is evidence that suggests that energy price expectations during the mid 1970s and early 1980s pointed to a more pessimistic energy price behavior than what actually occurred. We have simulated the impact of the energy crisis under each of the above price expectations. In all cases we obtain drops in market value larger than or equal than that of our benchmark experiments. Hence, the drop in market values derived in Section 4 should be considered as a lower bound of the impact of the energy crisis of the mid 1970s.

5.4 Supporting evidence at the Industrial Level

The market value of 106 out of the 109 3-digit SIC non-energy producing manufacturing industries listed in Standard and Poor’s COMPUSTAT went down, by 46% on average, between 1972 and 1974. This computation controls for entry and exit of firms as we only consider firms that were listed by 1972 and were still listed by 1974. Hence, the market value of firms in most industrial sectors declined substantially in 1974.

It is important to understand that our analysis of the impact of the oil crisis is designed to study macroeconomic aggregates. However, we consider instructive to evaluate the transmission mechanism from our model at the industrial level. In our model, the more energy efficient the new technology is, the larger the drop in the market value of old capital one will observe. We have no direct way of measuring the relative energy efficiency of the new technology at the industrial (or aggregate) level. However, the higher the energy efficiency of the new technology, the lower the long run energy intensity one will observe. Hence, if our transmission mechanism is important at the industrial level, one should observe that sectors that have experienced larger savings in energy consumption per unit of output are also the ones that suffered the larger drops in market value on 1974. Available data suggests that is indeed the case. We performed the following simple regression

\[
\text{Percentage drop in Market value from 1972 to 1974}_i = \alpha + \beta \left\{ \left( \frac{\text{Energy expenditure}}{\text{Value added}}_{94} \right) - \left( \frac{\text{Energy expenditure}}{\text{Value added}}_{71} \right) \right\}_i + \varepsilon_i.
\]

Here, \( i \) denotes each of the 3-digit SIC non-energy producing manufacturing sectors. The data on energy expenditure and value added comes from Annual Survey of Manufactures. Figure 5 presents a scattered plot of these data.
We found coefficient $\beta$ to be negative (-2.53) and statistically significant at the 98% level. Hence, sectors where expenditures in energy per unit of value added have increased the least over the last 20 years (and thus, sectors where energy saving has been higher) are also the ones that suffered the largest drop in market value during 1974. This empirical result suggests that the transmission mechanism proposed by our model may also be relevant for understanding market values at the sectoral level.

6 Conclusion

This paper employs a calibrated dynamic general equilibrium model to evaluate how much of the stock market crash of 1973-74 can be accounted for by changes in energy prices and adoption of energy-saving technologies. In a world where capital is technology specific, and investment decisions irreversible, we find that the observed changes in energy prices, together with the energy-saving technologies derived from the energy use series data, translate into a 24% drop in Tobin’s average $q$. This corresponds to almost half of the observed drop in $q$ of the mid-70’s. Our model is qualitatively consistent not only with the data patterns in equity prices, but also with the economic slowdown of the mid-70’s. Our analysis indicates that changes in energy prices should be part of any theory of the stock market collapse of 1973-74.

7 Data Appendix

Here we outline how the major series used in the figures were constructed.
Figures 1 and 2. Ratio of Market Value to Replacement Cost of Tangible Assets for Corporations and to GDP

Market value of corporations was constructed using data from the *Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States* (FOF) issued by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB).\(^9\) In the FOF, domestic corporations are divided into nonfinancial and financial corporate business. Financial corporations are further divided to the following categories as listed in Table F.213: Commercial banking, life insurance companies, other insurance companies, closed-end funds, exchange-traded funds, real estate investment trusts (REITs) and brokers and dealers.

Our measure of market value reflects both equity value and debt of all domestic corporations, and all direct or indirect (through mutual funds) intercorporate holdings of corporate equity and debt has been netted out. To that effect market value of domestic corporations (MV) has been constructed as follows:

\[
MV = \text{Corporate equity issued by nonfinancial and financial corporate businesses} + \text{Net financial liabilities (i.e. Total liabilities - total financial assets) of nonfarm nonfinancial corporate businesses, commercial banks, life insurance companies, other insurance companies, closed-end funds, exchange-traded funds, REITs, and security brokers and dealers.}
\]

We construct the market value for energy-producing industries (the sum of coal mining, oil and gas extraction, petroleum, electric services and gas services) and subtract this from total MV to arrive at the market value of non-energy producing corporations.

Replacement cost of tangible assets of corporations was constructed using data from the *Fixed Assets Tables* (FA) reported by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)\(^10\) and also from the FOF. Our measure of tangible assets include all nonresidential and residential fixed assets, plus inventories. Corporate fixed assets are the sum of corporate nonresidential fixed assets and corporate residential fixed assets. Stock of inventories held by nonfarm nonfinancial corporations is from the FOF. We assume financial corporations hold no inventories as their inventory investment is zero in the product account, and we neglect inventories held by farm corporations since they are negligibly small.

We subtract the capital stock of energy-producing corporations (coal mining, oil and gas extraction, petroleum, electric services and gas services) from the total. This data was obtained from the BEA Table 5KCU.

Figure 3. Energy Prices relative to the GDP Deflator

We follow the methodology outlined in Atkeson & Kehoe [3] and construct an energy price deflator from a weighted average of coal, natural gas, petroleum and electricity consumed in the commercial, industrial and the transportations sectors. This excludes residential consumption as we focus only on the business sector and also energy consumed by the electric power sector.

\(^9\) This data can be downloaded from the FRB website at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/data.htm.
\(^10\) This data can be downloaded from the BEA website at http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn/faweb/AllFATables.asp.
as in our model all energy is imported. We assume 60% of petroleum used in the transportation sector is not business related and subtract this from total energy-consumption. We also exclude energy consumption of energy-producing sectors since production in our model refers only to non-energy production. To do this, we assume that energy-consumption in these sectors are proportional to their value added and subtract the resultant from the total industrial energy consumption.

We use quantity and price data reported in the Annual Energy Review (AER) 2001.\footnote{This data can be downloaded from the EIA website at \url{http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/contents.html}.} The quantity of each type of energy (measured in units of Btu) consumed in the commercial, industrial and the transportation sectors are from Tables 2.1c, 2.1d, 2.1e respectively. For prices we use consumer price estimates of energy (as businesses are consumers of energy) reported in Table 3.3 and we label the price of energy for each type as $P_i$. For each type of energy $i$, we add the consumption of that energy type in all sectors and call that $Q_i$. Then, total energy expenditure is simply $\sum_i Q_i P_i$. We calculate real energy use using 1972 prices as the base year. Hence real energy use equals to $\sum_i Q_{it} P_{t1972}$. The energy price deflator $P_t$ is simply the ratio of the total energy expenditure to total energy use:

$$P_t = \frac{\sum_i Q_{it} P_{it}}{\sum_i Q_{it} P_{t1972}}$$

The GDP deflator is constructed in the usual way from nominal and real GDP series reported in BEA’s NIPA Tables 1.1 and 1.2.

**Figure 4.** Energy Expenditure and use in the Business Sector

Total energy expenditures of the non-energy producing business sector was calculated as in Figure 3.3 and then was divided by the nominal GDP of the non-energy producing business sector (from NIPA). The total real energy use of the business sector (expenditure using 1972 prices) was calculated as explained for Figure 3.3. This number was divided by the real GDP of the business sector in 1972 prices. Real GDP of the business sector data is from BEA’s NIPA Table 1.8. We subtract the value-added of the energy-producing sectors. These numbers are reported in 1996 dollars. We first construct a price deflator using nominal and real GDP of the business sector, readjust the level of the deflator such that 1972 = 1 rather than 1996. Then we multiply this number with nominal GDP of business to get real GDP of business in 1972 dollars.

8 Computational appendix

Notice that, after the energy saving technology has been introduced the production set is convex and the first and second welfare theorems hold. Hence, the utility associated to a competitive equilibrium where technology 2 is already available can be obtained as a solution to the dynamic
programming problem

\[ v(k_1, k_2, p^e) = \max_{x_1, x_2, e_1, e_2} u(c) + \beta v(k_1', k_2', p^{e'}) \quad (7) \]

\[ s.t. \]

\[ c + x_1 + x_2 + p^e (e_1 + e_2) = (1 - \tau_y) y \]

\[ x_i \geq 0, \quad \text{for } i = 1, 2, \]

where the laws of motion of energy prices and total factor productivity are as described in Section 3. Notice that energy prices and TFP growth are time invariant after a finite number of periods, which allows us to solve for function \( v \) by backwards induction. To obtain an approximated solution to the dynamic programming problem (7) we employ the value function iteration algorithm with spline interpolation, as described in Santos [33].

The initial conditions of our problem imply that capital of type two is not available. Moreover, a minimum size investment must be incurred before the energy saving technology becomes available. This minimum size constraint introduces a non-convexity into the analysis. The second welfare theorem may not hold. Hence, we solve directly for the recursive competitive equilibrium of this economy, which is characterized by:

1. The firm’s problem:

\[ W(k_1, p^e) = \max_{e_1, x_1, n_1, D} \{ (1 - \tau_y) y - wn_1 - p^e e_1 - x_1 - D \} + \]

\[ \beta v(k_1', k_2', p^{e'}) \quad \text{if } D \geq C \]

\[ \beta W(k_1', p^{e'}) \quad \text{if } D < C \]

2. The Household’s problem:

\[ H(s, p^e) = \max_{s', c} u(c) + \beta H(s', p^{e'}) \quad \text{s.t.} \]

\[ c + V(s' - s) = wN + ds \]

\[ s' \geq 0. \]
In equilibrium, the following feasibility and market clearing constraints must be satisfied:

\[ c + x_1 + p^e e_1 + D = (1 - \tau_y) y \]
\[ n_1 = N \]
\[ s = 1. \]

We obtain a numerical approximation to each of the above value functions using the value function iteration algorithm, for each given set of prices. Finally, we solve for the set of prices that makes the household’s and firm’s choices compatible with market clearing and feasibility.

References


